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SUBSTANTIVE EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
UNDER STATE V. RUSSELL, AND THE POTENTIAL
IMPACT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
There comes a time when we cannot and must not close our eyes
when presented with evidence that certain laws, regardless of the
purpose for which they were enacted, discriminate unfairly on the
basis of race .... '
In State v. Russell,2 the Minnesota Supreme Court invalidated a law
that it considered to discriminate unfairly on the basis of race.3 The court
reasoned that stiffer sentences for crimes involving cocaine base (crack
cocaine) compared to sentences for crimes involving powder cocaine had a
disproportionate impact on African-Americans. 4 In Russell, the court deter-
mined that statistical proof of discriminatory impact alone was sufficient
to establish an equal protection challenge under the state constitution.5 The
court in Russell, therefore, subjected a facially neutral sentencing statute to
what the court called a "stricter standard of rational basis review. ' 6
In applying this standard, the Minnesota court implicitly renounced the
United States Supreme Court's ruling in Washington v. Davis that proof
of racially discriminatory impact alone was insufficient to establish an equal
protection claim under the United States Constitution.8 In Davis, the Court
determined that an intent or purpose to discriminate must accompany the
resulting disproportionate impact before the Court applies strict scrutiny
review of the government action. 9 Absent proof of intentional discrimina-
1. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 n.2 (Minn. 1991).
2. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
3. State'v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991); see infra notes 135-221 and
accompanying text (providing detailed discussion of Russell decision).
4. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888 n.2.
5. Id. at 889; MINN. CoNsr. art. I, § 2. Article I, § 2 of the Minnesota Constitution
provides that "[n]o member of this State shall be disenfranchised or deprived of any of the
rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land or the judgment
of his peers." The Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted article I section 2 to be the state
Equal Protection Clause. See infra notes 107-93 and accompanying text (discussing development
of independent Minnesota equal protection standard based on article I, § 2).
6. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889.
7. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).)
8. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888 n.2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV § 1. Section one of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides the basis for federal equal protection challenges contesting
the validity of state policies. Section one reads in pertinent part: "No State shall ... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
9. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976) (holding that discriminatory
purpose must accompany disparate impact before federal courts will invoke strict scrutiny). Inf
Davis, the Court considered an equal protection challenge to an examination the District of
Columbia Metropolitan Police Department administered to job applicants. Id. at 232. The
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tion, the Court subjects the challenged government policy to rational basis
review. 10
The federal requirement of proof of invidious intent forecloses many
equal protection claims challenging facially neutral government policies that
disparately impact racial minorities." The purposeful discrimination require-
ment especially inhibits equal protection challenges in the criminal procedure
context.' 2 Commentators, 3 judges, 4 and attorneys 5 argue that statistics
plaintiffs argued that the test resulted in a disparately large impact in screening out black
candidates. Id. at 235. According to the Davis Court, the Supreme Court had never accepted
the idea that a law was unconstitutional solely because it resulted in a racially disparate impact.
Id. at 239. Rather, the Court rejected the contention that statistically disproportionate racial
impacts would invalidate otherwise permissible enactments. Id at 240-41. The Court therefore
concluded that the invidious quality of a law ultimately depended upon whether or not the
government acted with a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 240. The Davis Court then held that
disproportionate impact, without proof of discriminatory intent, would not trigger strict scrutiny
review. Id. at 242.
10. Id. at 246.
11. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977)
(holding that developer in housing development controversy failed to satisfy burden of proving
discriminatory purpose); Davis, 426 U.S. at 246 (requiring proof of invidious intent before
invoking strict scrutiny); see also Gayle Binion, "Intent" and Equal Protection: A Reconsid-
eration, 1983 SuP. CT. REv. 397, 397-98 (arguing that intent requirement creates formidable
barrier to equal protection challenges); Donald E. Lively & Stephen Plann, Equal Protection
and the Rehnquist Court: Compounding a Legacy of Constitutional Vagrancy, 22 U. TOL. L.
REv. 717, 719-20 (1991) (claiming that Supreme Court uses intent requirement to avoid realities
of discrimination); Robert Nelson, Note, To Infer or Not to Infer a Discriminatory Purpose:
Rethinking Equal Protection Doctrine, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 334, 336 (1986) (stating that intent
requirement prevents invalidation of laws that have discriminatory impact); Veronica Patton,
Comment, Rethinking Equal Protection Doctrine in the Wake of McCleskey v. Kemp, 11
NAT'L BLACK L.J. 348, 348 (1990) (noting that many commentators object to intent requirement
because it creates insurmountable evidentiary burden for person bringing equal protection
challenge).
12. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (holding that statistical proof of
disparate impact in administration of death penalty without evidence of invidious intent is
insufficient to warrant strict scrutiny); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985) (ruling
that defendant must prove racially discriminatory intent influenced selective prosecution in his
case); Nelson, supra note 10, at 336-37 (noting difficulties in bringing equal protection challenges
under intent requirement and citing specific exceptions to intent requirement in criminal
context).
13. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARv. L.
Rav. 1472 (1988) [hereinafter Developments] (tracing racial discrimination throughout criminal
justice system); Norval Morris, Race and Crime: What Evidence Is There That Race Influences
Results in the Criminal Justice System?, 72 JUDICATURE 111, 113 (1988) (arguing that racial
discrimination pervades criminal justice system); John A. Powell & Eileen B. Hershenov,
Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse, the Constitution and the Black Community,
24 U.C. DAvIs L. Rav. 557, 559 (1991) (maintaining that war on drugs disparately impacts
minority communities); Dan Baum, The Drug War on Civil Liberties, THE NATION, June 29,
1992, at 886 (asserting that drug war is actually war against minorities).
14. See Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity,
28 Am. CRit. L. REv. 161, 165 (1991) (arguing that sentencing guidelines have not sufficiently
decreased sentencing disparities between races). Gerald Heaney is a Senior Circuit Judge for
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Id. at 161. In a footnote, Judge
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indicate that the criminal justice system unfairly discriminates against racial
minorities.' 6 The discrimination, they claim, can occur at almost any stage
of the judicial process from arrest through sentencing. 17 Most of the potential
discrimination results not from intentionally discriminatory laws but instead
from facially neutral policies with racially disproportionate impacts. 8 There-
fore, under federal equal protection analysis, most criminal procedure equal
protection challenges fail under rational basis review. 19
If other state courts, under their state constitutions, decide to apply the
Russell approach to other aspects of the criminal justice system that are
arguably discriminatory, 20 the results could be far-reaching. 2' Innovative
defense attorneys could raise equal protection challenges based solely on
statistical evidence of discrimination at nearly every stage of the criminal
process.22 The Minnesota "stricter standard of rational basis review" could
Heaney thanked Chief Judge G. Thomas Eisele of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas for his contributions and comments on the sentencing guidelines.
Id. at 161 n.*; Lois G. Forer, Justice by the Numbers: Mandatory Sentencing Drove Me from
the Bench, 24 WASH. MONTHLY, Apr. 1992, at 12 (maintaining that racial disparities in
sentencing still exist despite Sentencing Guidelines).
15. See Mark Curriden, Racism Mars Justice in U.S., Panel Reports, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Aug. 11, 1991, at DI (citing attorneys who believe criminal justice system is biased
against African-Americans); David G. Savage, One in Four Young Blacks in Jail or in Court
Control, Study Says, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1990, at Al (quoting attorneys who believe
discrimination pervades entire criminal justice system).
16. But see WILLIAM WILBANKS, THE MYTH OF A RACIST CRaMNAL JusTIcE SYSTEM 6-7
(1987) (concluding that criminal justice system is not discriminatory against African-Americans);
Theresa W. Katie & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congres-
sional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 393, 407 (1991) (concluding
on basis of sentencing guidelines study that'unwarranted sentencing disparities have decreased);
Stephen Klein et al., Race and Imprisonment Decisions in California, 247 Sci. 812, 816 (1990)
(finding no evidence of racial discrimination in California courts' sentencing decisions); Stephen
J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem Is Uniformity, Not
Disparity, 29 AM. Ciam. L. REv. 833, 835-47 (1992) (finding methodological flaws in Judge
Heaney's study that indicated greater disparity under Sentencing Guidelines).
17. See supra notes 12-14 and infra notes 236-317 and accompanying text (discussing
possibility that racial discrimination exists from arrest through sentencing procedures).
18. See Morris, supra note 12, at 113 (pointing out that criminal justice system is
discriminatory in operation, not plan or intent).
19. See LAURENCE H. TamE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6, at 1451 (2d ed.
1988) (recounting how Supreme Court almost always invalidates challenged action under strict
scrutiny); Joseph M. Sellers, The Impact of Intent on Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 84
DICK. L. REv. 363, 376 (1980) (noting that determination of which level of scrutiny applies
generally determines whether Court will find equal protection violation).
20. See supra note 15 (citing sources that indicate racial discrimination is not systemic
or significant). This note uses the phrase "arguably discriminatory" to indicate that experts
disagree over whether racial discrimination exists in the criminal justice system.
21. See infra notes 236-317 and accompanying text (providing analysis regarding potential
application of Russell approach).
22. See infra notes 236-317 and accompanying text (discussing possible challenges based
on discriminatory impact). Although this Note primarily intends to criticize the Minnesota
Supreme Court's substantive equal protection approach, defense attorneys may find helpful
some of the arguments presented as hypothetical reasons why a court may invalidate certain
procedures under the Russell approach.
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result in the judicial invalidation under state constitutions of many criminal
procedures.
2
The Minnesota Supreme Court's approach in Russell, however, amounts
to nothing more than substantive equal protection analysis reminiscent of
the long since discredited Lochner v. New York 24 substantive due process
approach.25 Put simply, the court in Russell acted as a super-legislature with
veto power over the enactment of a statutory provision that a majority of
the court found unwise.26 Although the Minnesota Supreme Court's goal of
eliminating racial disparities in the criminal justice system is commendable,
its approach is dubious. 27 The legislature, not the judiciary, is the proper
forum for eliminating the facially neutral aspects of the criminal justice
system that are discriminatory in impact.? A brief comparison of the federal
and the Minnesota Supreme Court's equal protection tests along with a
demonstration of how the Minnesota test might apply in other criminal
justice contexts illustrates the far-reaching implications of the Minnesota
approach and demonstrates that the legislature is best suited to address
criminal justice policies that disparately impact minorities.
I. FEDERAL EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
Federal equal protection analysis differs significantly from the Minnesota
model. 29 The United States Supreme Court, when faced with an equal
protection challenge, generally chooses among three different standards of
review: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny. 0 The least
23. See infra notes 236-317 and accompanying text (discussing possible invalidation of
criminal procedures under State v. Russell analysis).
24. 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see infra note 213 (discussing Lochner decision in greater detail).
25. See Deborah K. McKnight, Minnesota Rational Relation Test: The Lochner Monster
in the 10,000 Lakes, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 709, 711 (1984) (contending that Minnesota
rational basis test in cases prior to Russell employed substantive review standard similar to
Lochner); infra notes 213-17 and accompanying text (discussing Lochner and Supreme Court's
rejection of substantative review analysis).
26. See infra notes 161-86 and accompanying text (reviewing Minnesota Supreme Court's
independent evaluation of legislative testimony).
27. See infra notes 327-33 and accompanying text (discussing desirability of legislative
decisionmaking).
28. See infra notes 94-100, 320-22 and accompanying text (discussing inherent problems
with judicial reliance on statistical evidence as proof of discrimination as trigger for substantive
review).
29. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 887-88 (1991); see McKnight, supra note 24, at
711-14 (1984) (distinguishing Minnesota rational basis test from federal standard); Judith A.
Zollar, Note, Discriminatory Impact Analysis: A State Constitutional Approach: State v.
Russell, 477 N. W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991), 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 497, 505-07 (1992) (explaining
elements of Minnesota rational basis test and federal heightened scrutiny analysis).
30. See RONALD D.. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND P'ROCEDURE § 18.3, at 12-41 (2d ed. 1992) (describing three federal standards
of review in equal protection cases); TRIBE, supra note 19, § 16-2, at 1439-40, § 16-6, at 1451
(analyzing federal equal protection review standards).
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scrutinizing, most deferential standard of review is the rational basis test.'
Under the rational basis test, also known as the conceivable basis test,32 the
Court upholds the challenged classification so long as the Court recognizes
some set of facts that could constitute a basis for the classification.33 The
federal rational basis tests requires that (1) the challenged legislation has a
legitimate purpose, and (2) that it was reasonable for the lawmakers to
believe that the use of the challenged classification would promote that
purpose.3 4 In other words, the classification must not be arbitrary and must
bear a reasonable relationship to the purpose of the legislation.
35
Although not as deferential as the rational basis test, the second tier of
review, the intermediate scrutiny test, is less demanding than strict scrutiny
review.36 Intermediate scrutiny requires that the classification bear a sub-
stantial relationship to an important government interest.37 Intermediate
scrutiny differs from the rational basis test in that the Court will not
hypothesize an arguable relationship between the legislation's purpose and
the classification. The Court formally has adopted the intermediate stan-
dard of review only in cases involving gender and illegitimacy discrimina-
tion. 3
9
31. See ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 30, at 14 (describing rational basis review);
TRIBE, supra note 19, at 1440 (same).
32. See TRIBE, supra note 19, at 1443. For the purposes of this Note, "rational basis,"
"rational relationship," "minimum rationality," and "conceivable basis" will all refer to the
minimum level of scrutiny used by the Court.
33. See Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671-72
(1980) (upholding California's retaliatory insurance tax because it was reasonable for lawmakers
to believe classification would promote law's purpose); Allied Stores Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522, 528-29 (1958) (upholding statute because legislature may have conceivably adopted that
law for legitimate purpose); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 563
(1946) (sustaining classification because it may provide boost to morale and esprit de corps
among river pilots).
34. Western, 451 U.S. at 668.
35. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (upholding state
statute that placed ban on retail sale of plastic, nonreturnable, nonrefillable milk containers,
but permitted retail sale of nonreturnable, nonrefillable, paperboard milk containers). The
Court in Clover Leaf reviewed the challenged classification under the rational basis test and
concluded that there was evidence before the legislature that reasonably supported the classi-
fication. Id. at 461. The Court then determined that whether the classification was rationally
related to the statute's purpose was debatable. Id. at 464. Therefore, the Court upheld the
classification. Id. at 470.
36. See ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 30, § 18.3, at 16-17 (describing requirements of
intermediate scrutiny); James A. Kushner, Substantive Equal Protection: The Rehnquist Court
and the Fourth Tier of Judicial Review, 53 Mo. L. Rav. 423, 454-55 (1988) (characterizing
requirements of middle level scrutiny test).
37. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (explaining that classifi-
cations based on gender must bear "close and substantial" relationship to important govern-
mental objectives).
38. Id.; see ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 30, § 18.3, at 22 (describing intermediate
scrutiny review).
39. See ROTUNDA .& NowAK, supra note 30, § 18.3, at 17 (explaining when Supreme
Court applies intermediate scrutiny); Kushner, supra note 36, at 455 (describing applicability
of intermediate scrutiny).
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The third and least deferential standard of review is strict scrutiny
review. 4° Under strict scrutiny review, the Supreme Court independently
determines whether the classification bears a sufficiently close relationship
to a compelling or overriding governmental purpose. 4' The strict scrutiny
test requires a compelling or overriding governmental interest and a close
relationship between the classification and the state interest.42 As with
intermediate scrutiny cases, under strict scrutiny the Court will not hypoth-
esize a reasonable explanation for the classification.
4
Generally, vwhether a challenged classification will be invalidated depends
upon which level of scrutiny the Court employs in reviewing the government
action." Strict scrutiny review, for example, nearly always results in the
invalidation of the challenged classification. 4 The Court applies strict scru-
tiny review, however, only in limited circumstances: when a classification
involves a suspect class, 46 such as the members of a particular race or
religion, or in cases involving discriminatory intent or purpose. 47 Conse-
quently, the goal of the individual contesting a classification is to convince
the Court to invoke strict scrutiny review.
4
1
40. See ROTUNDA & NowAx, supra note 30, § 18.3, at 15 (defining requirements of strict
scrutiny); TRIBE, supra note 19, at 1451-52 (describing significance of strict scrutiny in
determining validity of classifications); Kushner, supra note 36, at 455-56 (describing require-
ments of strict scrutiny); Sellers, supra note 19, at 376 (explaining that success of equal
protection challenge depends on whether Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny).
41. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944) (holding that racially
restrictive curfew bore sufficiently close relationship to governmental interests).
42. See Sue Davis, Justice Rehnquist's Equal Protection Clause: An Interim Analysis,
63 NEB. L. Rav. 288, 291 (1984) (explaining that strict scrutiny requires that classification be
only means of achieving compelling state interest); Melanie E. Meyers, Note, Impermissible
Purposes and the Equal Protection Clause, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 1184, 1185-86 (1986) (describing
how strict scrutiny requires narrowly tailored classification that serves compelling state interest).
43. RoTuNDA & NowAc, supra note 30, at 15.
44. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (expressing importance of invocation
of strict scrutiny in order to facilitate invalidation of challenged classification).
45. See TmE, supra note 19, § 16-6, at 1451 (describing strict scrutiny review as .'strict'
in theory and usually 'fatal' in fact"). Tribe's analysis is especially poignant with regard to
strict scrutiny of racial classifications. Id. at 1451-52. Only in Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218,
has the Supreme Court upheld an explicitly racially discriminatory government action under
strict scrutiny. TRIE, supra note 19, § 16-6, at 1452.
46. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (applying strict scrutiny review to
racial classification); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (applying strict scrutiny
review to strike down criminal statute which distinguished on the basis of race); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (applying strict scrutiny to racial classification).
47. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66
(1977) (stating that when discriminatory intent is not present, Court will not apply heightened
scrutiny); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 243 (1976) (holding that in absence of discrim-
inatory intent, court will not invoke strict scrutiny).
48. See Edward L. Barrett, The Rational Basis Standard for Equal Protection Review
of Ordinary Legislative Classifications, 68 Ky. L.J. 845, 860 (1979-1980) (arguing that claimants




Government classifications arise under three different circumstances. 9
First, a legislative enactment may create a classification on its face.5 0 In
other words, the law specifically classifies persons for different treatment.51
Second, the government may create a classification through the application
of a facially neutral law. 2 For example, the government might enforce a
facially neutral law against only one racial group. 3 Third, a facially neutral
law that is not discriminatory in application may nevertheless be discrimi-
natory in effect.14 For instance, a rule that requires all prospective employees
to take an exam may result in the disqualification of more minorities than
caucasians.5
5
The Supreme Court will not apply strict scrutiny review to a facially
neutral enactment unless the law discriminates both in effect and purpose.16
As a prerequisite to strict scrutiny review, the Court requires proof that the
government chose a course of action because of, and not merely in spite
of, the discriminatory impact.5 7 Under the purposeful discrimination re-
49. See ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 30, § 18.2, at 9 (listing ways in which government
actions classify).
50. See id. § 18.4 at 42 (describing how law can classify "on its face"); TRIBE, supra
note 19, § 16-14, at 1466 (explaining facially invidious classifications).
51. ROTUNDA & NowAc, supra note 30, § 18.4 at 42. For example, the statute in Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), permitted only white males over the age of 21 to serve
as jurors. Id. at 305. When a black defendant challenged the statutory classification, the
Supreme Court ruled that the statute impermissibly created a classification in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 308.
52. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (holding that enforcement of
San Francisco ordinance banning hand laundries in wooden buildings violated equal protection
guarantees of aliens). In Yick Wo, the Court considered whether the enforcement of a facially
neutral ordinance banning wooden laundries violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 366. The petitioner was a native of China who ran a laundry
in a wooden building in San Francisco. Id. at 358. San Francisco enacted an ordinance that
prohibited laundries in wooden buildings. Id. Petitioner challenged the ordinance on the
grounds that the city officials enforced the law in a discriminatory manner based on race. Id.
at 359. The Court first defined the equal protection guarantee as being the right to equal
treatment for all under like circumstances. Id. at 367. The Court then determined that because
San Francisco officials applied the law in a discriminatory manner against Chinese launderers,
the application of the law was unconstitutional. Id. at 373-74; see also ROTUNDA & NowAK,
supra note 30, § 18.4, at 42 (describing equal protection claim based on discriminatory
application of facially neutral law).
53. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74 (determining city officials unfairly discriminated
against Chinese launderers by enforcing ordinance against Chinese launderers and not Cau-
casians).
54. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (invalidating statute because
Court found proof of disparate racial impact combined with invidious intent).
55. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 235 (1976) (noting that police examination
at issue screens out more African-Americans than Caucasians).
56. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (holding that discriminatory impact alone falls to trigger
strict scrutiny); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-49 (1972) (refusing to invoke strict
scrutiny without proof of invidious intent).
57. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (holding that discriminatory
purpose "implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences").
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quirement, statistical evidence of disparate impact alone is insufficient to
warrant invocation of strict scrutiny in federal equal protection analysis."
Rather, proof of statistically disproportionate impact may be relevant in
proving discriminatory intent, but such proof rarely is dispositive.5 9
The requirement that discriminatory intent accompany disproportionate
impact is a major hurdle to discriminatory impact equal protection chal-
lenges. 60 In discriminatory impact challenges, the Court places the burden
to prove the existence of discriminatory purpose on the individual challeng-
ing the classification. 6' Although the Court in Palmer v. Thompson62 ac-
knowledged the futility of judicial review of motivations that lie behind
legislative enactments, 63 five years later, in Washington v. Davis, the Court
decided that despite the difficulties of ascertaining governmental motivation,
such an inquiry was not only possible but also necessary for equal protection
analysis.6' In Davis, the Court announced that the totality of relevant facts,
including the disparate statistical impact, would be pertinent in equal pro-
tection challenges.
65
The next year, in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel-
opment Corp.," the Court clarified what proof would satisfy the invidious
intent requirement. In Arlington Heights, the Court declared that a plaintiff
need not prove that the challenged action arose from a discriminatory
58. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (requiring defendant to prove pur-
poseful discrimination in his case); Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274 (holding that purposeful discrim-
ination is key element in equal protection claim); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (maintaining that although disparate impact is not
irrelevant, invidious intent is determinative factor in equal protection challenge); Davis, 426
U.S. at 239 (rejecting equal protection claim based solely on disparate racial impact); Hackney,
406 U.S. at 548 (rejecting equal protection claim grounded solely on statistical disparate
impact).
59. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293, 298 (1987).
60. See Binion, supra note 11, at 397 (explaining that intent requirement is formidable
barrier to invalidation of government actions challenged on equal protection grounds); Randall
L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101
HARv. L. REv. 1388, 1402 (1988) (noting that "no defendant in state or federal court has
ever successfully challenged his punishment on grounds of racial discrimination in sentencing");
Lively & Plann, supra note 11, at 720 (arguing that intent requirement in equal protection
analysis avoids realities of laws which result in disparate racial impacts by creating unman-
ageable burden of proof); Nelson, supra note 11, at 334-35 (describing how equal protection
claims fail for lack of proof of discriminatory purpose).
61. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 (requiring defendant to prove decisionmakers acted
with discriminatory purpose in his case); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985)
(requiring petitioner to prove Government prosecuted him with intent to discriminate).
62. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
63. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971) (describing futility of trying to
ascertain motivation behind enactment).
64. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); see supra note 8 (discussing Davis
in detail).
65. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
66. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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motive.67 Rather, after again acknowledging that single or even dominant
motivations68 are rarely the basis of legislative and administrative actions,
the Court in Arlington Heights announced the specific types of circumstan-
tial evidence that would support a claim of purposeful discrimination. 69 The
Court stated that the historical background of the decision, 70 the specific
events leading to the challenged action, and any departures from normal
procedure would be instructive in the search for discriminatory intent.
71
In 1986, the Court extended the intentional discrimination requirement
to capital sentencing in McCleskey v. Kemp.72 In McCleskey, a jury of
eleven Caucasian jurors and one African-American juror73 convicted Warren
McCleskey, an African-American, of two counts of armed robbery and one
count of murder.74 At a later sentencing hearing, the jury sentenced Mc-
Cleskey to death for the murder of a Caucasian police officer." After
McCleskey's state appeals failed, McCleskey sought federal habeas corpus
relief on the ground that the Georgia capital sentencing process had a
statistically disproportionate impact on African-Americans and therefore
67. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (holding
that developer in housing development controversy failed to satisfy burden of proving discrim-
inatory purpose). In Arlington Heights, the Court addressed whether the Village of Arlington
Heights' refusal to rezone a 15-acre parcel of land from a single-family to multiple-family
classification violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 263. The Metropolitan Housing
Development Corporation applied to Arlington Heights for the rezoning of the land. Id. at
254. The Village denied the request and then the plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the Village's
decision would result in a racially disparate impact. Id. at 263. The Court reaffirmed the
Washington v. Davis requirement that the person bringing the equal protection challenge show
discriminatory intent in order to support a disparate impact equal protection challenge. Id. at
264-65. The Court then explained what circumstantial evidence would help support a claim of
invidious discrimination. Id. at 266.
68. Id. at 265.
69. Id. at 266-68.
70. Id. at 267; see also hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 223 (1984) (holding 1901
voting restriction in Alabama unconstitutional because state legislature originally enacted law
as part of white supremacy movement).
71. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267; see Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in
Equal Protection, 41 STm. L. Rnv. 1105, 1112 (1989) (listing factors which Court would
accept as circumstantial evidence of invidious intent).
72. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
73. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 377 n.15 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
74. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 283.
75. Id. at 284. At the time of McCleskey's conviction, Georgia used a bifurcated trial
and sentencing process. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-2(c) (1982). The Georgia Code provided that
when a jury convicted a defendant of murder, the court should "resume the trial and conduct
a presentence hearing before the jury." GA. CODE Am. § 17-10-2(c) (1982); McCleskey, 481
U.S. at 284 n.2. At the sentencing phase, the Georgia Code required the jury to find, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that at least one aggravating circumstance to the murder existed before
the jury could impose the death penalty. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(c) (1982); McCleskey,
481 U.S. at 284. The jury in McCleskey's case found two aggravating circumstances: McCleskey
committed the murder during the commission of an armed robbery, and McCleskey murdered
a police officer engaged in the performance of his duty. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 284-85.
McCleskey presented no mitigating evidence at the hearing. Id. at 285.
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violated the Equal Protection Clause. 76 McCleskey based his appeal on a
study77 that concluded that defendants charged with killing Caucasian victims
were 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty than defendants who
killed African-American victims. 78 The study also found that prosecutors
sought the death penalty most often when the victim was Caucasian and
the defendant was African-American.
79
Despite the evidence of the disproportionate impact in capital sentencing
cases in Georgia, the Supreme Court narrowly rejected McCleskey's equal
protection challenge. 0 In reaching its decision, the Court relied in part on
Wayte v. United States."' In Wayte, the Court decided that in a selective
prosecution equal protection challenge, the defendant must prove that the
purposeful discrimination had a direct effect on his prosecution.8 2 Trans-
ferring that requirement to capital sentencing, the McCleskey court con-
cluded that McCleskey had to prove that the decisionmakers in his case
acted with discriminatory purpose. 83 The McCleskey Court summarily re-
jected McCleskey's argument that the Court should extend its acceptance
of statistical disparities as proof of an equal protection violation beyond
the jury venire cases.14 In the jury venire cases, the Court accepts statistical
disparities as proof of an equal protection violation, and then the burden
shifts to the state to rebut the presumption of a violation.8 5 In McCleskey,
76. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286.
77. Id. at 286. Professors David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski and George Woodworth
performed the study of the administration of the death penalty in Georgia. See David C.
Badus et. al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty:
A Challenge to State Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REv. 133 (1986) [hereinafter the Baldus
study] (providing detailed account of study's findings).
78. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287.
79. Id. at 287.
80. Id. at 297.
81. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
82. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985) (holding that defendant must
prove that racially discriminatory intent influenced selective prosecution in his case). In Wayte,
the Court considered whether a passive enforcement policy which led to the prosecution of
only those men who reported that they would not obey the law violated equal protection
guarantees. Id. at 600. The government in Wayte prosecuted the defendant for failure to
register for Selective Service. Id. at 603. The government prosecuted only those individuals
who either advised government officials that they would not register or those whom other
people reported as having not registered. Id. at 601. The defendant alleged that such a system
of prosecution violated his First and Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 600. The Wayte Court
began its analysis by describing the broad discretion afforded to prosecutors in their selection
of whom to prosecute. Id. at 607. The decision to prosecute, the Court determined, could not
be based on arbitrary classifications, but the Court also decided to apply ordinary equal
protection standards to selective prosecution claims. Id. at 608. The Court then concluded that
the defendant must demonstrate that the government chose to prosecute him "because of"
and not merely "in spite of" the adverse effects upon an identifiable group. Id. at 610. The
Court rejected Wayte's claim because he failed to satisfy the intent requirement. Id.
83. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987).
84. Id. at 293-97.
85. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977) (establishing three-prong test for
equal protection analysis in grand jury selection case).
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though, the Court distinguished capital sentencing from the jury cases and
determined that extending the impact-inference standard to sentencing cases
would be inappropriate. 6 The Court then held that the statistical evidence
was insufficient to support an inference of discriminatory intent in Mc-
Cleskey's case.
7
The requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate invidious intent is highly
controversial because the purposeful discrimination requirement serves as a
nearly insurmountable barrier for many disparate impact equal protection
challenges."' The Court's use of the purposeful discrimination requirement
could result from the Court's reluctance to question legislative decisions. 9
From this perspective, invidious intent facilitates the Court's recognition of
the importance of separation of powers. 90 The Court will scrutinize only
those enactments that are arbitrary.9' If the Court finds that the government
acted rationally, then the Court will decline to inquire into the wisdom of
the state policies.92
Moreover, the Court may be reluctant to rely on purely statistical
evidence out of a belief that the legislature is better suited to evaluate the
significance and validity of such evidence. 93 The Court may not want to
rely on disparate impact statistics because the statistics may not be com-
86. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 294. According to the McCleskey Court, the unique nature
of the capital sentencing decision and the innumerable factors on which the decision rested
precluded the effective use of statistics to establish an equal protection violation in that context.
Id. The Court also rejected McCleskey's argument because in jury venire selection cases the
state decisionmaker has an opportunity to rebut the inference of discrimination, but in capital
sentencing cases, the Court determined that the state would not have such an opportunity. Id.
at 296.
87. Id. at 297.
88. See id. (rejecting statistical proof of significant disparate impact in absence of proof
of discriminatory intent in defendant's case); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977) (rejecting developers' claim of disproportionate racial impact
where they provided no proof of discriminatory purpose to support equal protection claim);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (refusing to invalidate pre-employment test in
absence of invidious intent proof).
89. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that
Court's business is not to set policy by invalidating policies that majority finds unwise);
Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 670 (1980) (stating
that judiciary's role is not to review wisdom of state policies); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S.
535, 551 (1971) (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970), for proposition
that Court does not decide wisdom of state laws).
90. See Kushner, supra note 36, at 426 (arguing that rational basis standard allows
legislature considerable freedom to serve needs of public).
91. See Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959) (stating that classification
must not be palpably arbitrary).
92. See Western, 451 U.S. at 670 (limiting review of state policies to legitimacy of law's
purpose and not second-guessing wisdom of state policies); Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 551 (quoting
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970)).
93. See David G. Savage, Justices' Use of Statistics Baffles Experts, L.A. TIMEs, Apr.
24, 1987, at 19 (noting reasons for judicial reluctance to rely on statistical evidence).
1993] 1801
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1791
pletely accurate. 94 In McCleskey, for example, although the Court assumed
the accuracy of the statistics for the purpose of evaluating McCleskey's
claim,95 it nevertheless implied the study was not satisfactorily accurate in
reaching its conclusions. 96 Additionally, the Court may be reluctant to base
its decisions on statistical evidence because studies often produce conflicting
results. 97 The Court therefore may wish to defer to the legislature's evalu-
ation of the conflicting results. 9 Finally, the Court may not want to rely
on statistics because it would prefer to base its decisions on the facts of
the instant case, not on general statistical evidence. 99 Hence, the Court
requires defendants to prove discrimination in their own cases.'00
Another explanation asserts that the Court uses the intent requirement
because the Court fears the potentially far-reaching implications of a dif-
ferent approach. 0' In Davis, for instance, the Court noted its concern that
without proof of discriminatory intent, a rule invalidating facially neutral
statutes that disproportionately burden one race would raise serious ques-
tions and possibly invalidate welfare, tax, and licensing statutes. 02 Similarly,
in McCleskey the Court acknowledged its fear that if the Court accepted
McCleskey's claim, then the Court could soon have to face similar claims
involving other types of penalties. 03
94. See WILBANKS, supra note 16, at 40 (listing several problems with statistical evidence
indicating that criminal justice system is racially discriminatory); Schulhofer, supra note 16,
at 838-41 (demonstrating methodological flaws in Judge Heaney's study of disparity in Federal
Sentencing Guidelines); David Tuller, Prison Term Study Finds No Race Link, S.F. CHRON.,
Feb. 16, 1990, at A2 (indicating that studies may be of little value when they fail to address
every aspect of criminal justice system). Wilbanks lists seven separate underlying difficulties
with studies showing racism in the criminal justice system. WIBANICS, supra, note 16, at 40.
The two main problems Wilbanks lists are researcher bias and the nature of direct proof. Id.
at 40-43: Wilbanks concludes that because of the problems associated with proof of racial
disparities in the criminal justice system, it is not possible to prove the system is either
discriminatory or nondiscriminatory. Id. at 53.
95. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 n.7 (1987).
96. See id. at 297 (determining that Baldus study was insufficient to prove discrimination
in instant case).
97. See JoAN PETERSILIA, RACIAL DISPARITmS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 89 (1983)
(acknowledging that for every study that determines criminal justice system is discriminatory,
another study reaches contrary conclusion).
98. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319 (arguing that legislature, not judiciary, should
evaluate the validity of statistical evidence); Savage, supra note 15, at 19 (indicating popular
belief that legislature rather than judiciary should determine validity of death penalty).
99. See Savage, supra note 14, at 19 (maintaining that Supreme Court prefers to evaluate
specifics of instant case rather than general statistical data).
100. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) (requiring defendant to prove
decisionmakers acted with discriminatory purpose); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610
(1985) (same).
101. See TRIBE, supra note 18, § 16-20, at 1510 (arguing that intent requirement exemplifies
Court's trepidation about embracing possible far-reaching judicial remedies without intent
requirement); Binion, supra note 11, at 403 (listing reasons for supporting intent rule).
102. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (arguing that adoption of disparate
impact only rule would have far-reaching implications).
103. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 314-19 (arguing that McCleskey's equal protection claim
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Still another explanation for the Court's use of the intent requirement
is that the Court applies the intent rule because the Court is preoccupied
with process-based theories of democracy.1°4 This explanation asserts that
the Court is concerned only with the cleanliness of the decisionmaking
process and not with the outcomes of the decisions.105 Under the process-
based explanation, the Court views the Equal Protection Clause as prohib-
iting only deliberate use of discriminatory intent in the decisionmaking
process.106
II. MINNESOTA EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
Regardless of the United States Supreme Court's reason for applying
the intent requirement in federal equal protection analysis, the Court's use
of the rule forecloses equal protection challenges based on disproportionate
impact on minorities unless the plaintiff can somehow demonstrate discrim-
inatory purpose.2° The Court could, however, adopt the Minnesota Supreme
Court's approach to state equal protection challenges in the federal con-
text.10s In 1979, the Minnesota Supreme Court embarked on a rocky twelve
year battle over whether Minnesota equal protection analysis was synony-
mous with federal equal protection.9 -Prior to 1979, the court had construed
would raise serious questions about the principles that underlie our criminal justice system).
Justice Powell expressed his concern that if the Court allowed McCleskey's claim, other
defendants would raise similar claims about other types of sentences. Id. at 315.
104. See Binion, supra note 11, at 403-04 (observing that Supreme Court uses intent
requirement because it is only concerned with the "cleanliness" of decisionmaking process);
Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE
L.J. 1063, 1063-64 (1980) (explaining Supreme Court's reliance on process-based theories of
judicial review).
105. See Binion, supra note 11, at 403-04 (explaining the preoccupation with process-
based theories).
106. Id. at 404.
107. See supra notes 56-87 and accompanying text (discussing how equal protection
challenges fail despite evidence of discriminatory impact when proof of invidious intent is
lacking).
108. See infra notes 236-317 and accompanying text (discussing possible implications of
Russell approach applied to other aspects of criminal justice system).
109. See In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1986) (Wahl, J., concurring)
(tracing "battle of footnotes" in Minnesota Supreme Court equal protection rational basis
cases). Justice Wahl notes the Minnesota Supreme Court's inconsistency in determining whether
Minnesota applied a rational basis test different from the federal test. Id. Justice Wahl first
recounts that in 1982 in Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 281 n.14 (Minn.
1981), the court announced that the state rational basis test differed from the federal standard.
Turner, 391 N.W.2d at 771. Wahl then demonstrates that two years later in AFSCME Councils
6, 14, 65 & 96 v. Sundquist, 338 N.W.2d 560, 570 n.12 (Minn. 1983), the court stated that
the two standards were "coextensive." Turner, 391 N.W.2d at 771. Then, by 1984, in McGuire
v. C & I Restaurant, Inc., 346 N.W.2d 605, 613 n.10 (Minn. 1984), the Minnesota Supreme
Court decided the standards were indeed different. McGuire, 346 N.W.2d at 613 n.10. But,
two years after McGuire in Turner, Wahl notes, the court again announced that Minnesota
rational basis was the same was the federal standard and that only the exact wording of the
tests differed. Turner, 391 N.W.2d at 771 n.2. Justice Wahl concluded that the court should
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the standards of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to
be coextensive with the standards of equal protection under the Minnesota
Constitution."0
Beginning in 1979 with the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in
Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. State,"' Minnesota developed its own version
of the rational basis standard.12 In invalidating the distinction between
plastic, nonrefillable, nonreturnable milk containers and all other milk
containers," 3 the court determined that the distinction was not rationally
freely acknowledge the difference between the state and federal rational basis tests and stop
trying to justify the state standard by comparing to the federal test. Id. at 772.
The court in 1991 in Russell again used a footnote to compare the state and federal
standards. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 n.3 (Minn. 1991). Justice Wahl writing for
the majority claims that Minnesota's constitution "embodies principles of equal protection
synonymous to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution." Id. In support of that contention, Wahl cites State v. Forge, 262 N.W.2d 341,
347 n.23 (Minn. 1977), a case that predates the Minnesota court's 1981 decision in Wegan.
Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889 n.3. Even more curious is the language of the footnote in Forge
which Wahl cites. Id. The footnote in Forge states that the "standards of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are synonymous with the standards of equality" under
the Minnesota constitution. Forge, 262 N.W.2d at 347 n.23. Although Wahl uses the word
"principles," because he cites Forge which states the "standards" are the same, Wahl himself
contributes to the confusion and the ongoing "battle of the footnotes." Russell, 477 N.W.2d
at 889 n.3. A possible explanation is that since the court in Russell actually engaged in
substantive review, Wahl may have been attempting to pacify judges, attorneys and commen-
tators who would find such an activist approach highly offensive. See also Mcknight, supra
note 24, at 722-32 (tracing development of Minnesota rational basis test through 1983).
110. See State v. Forge, 262 N.W.2d 341, 347 n.23 (Minn. 1977) (equating Minnesota
standard with federal standard); Seamer v. Great N. Ry. Co., 172 N.W. 765, 768-69 (Minn.
1919) (turning to United States Supreme Court Fourteenth Amendment cases to support
conclusion classification need only be fair and reasonable and result in substantial equality);
see also McKnight, supra note 24, at 725 (arguing that adoption of less deferential rational
basis standard was abrupt departure from past Minnesota Supreme Court decisions).
111. 289 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
112. Clover Leaf Creamery v. State, 289 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 456
(1981) (invalidating distinction between plastic and paperboard nonreturnable milk containers
as being irrational and arbitrary). In Clover Leaf, the court considered the validity of a statute
which banned the use of nonreturnable, nonrefillable plastic milk containers but did not ban
other plastic nonrefillable containers or paperboard nonrefillable milk containers. Id. at 81.
The Minnesota legislature enacted the ban on plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable milk con-
tainers in an effort to encourage the reuse and recycling of materials and reduce the solid
waste management problem for the state. Id. at 81-82. The Clover Leaf court engaged in an
independent review of documentary evidence and concluded that the distinction between plastic
containers and paper containers was not rationally related to the statute's purpose. Id. at 82.
The court independently weighed the evidence before the trial court in reaching its conclusion
on the irrationality of the statute. Id. at 82-84. The court, however, invalidated the statute on
the ground that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantees
and not on the state Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 81.
113. Id. at 80-81. The Clover Leaf court noted that the statute banned only plastic milk
containers and not plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers of other liquids. Id. at 81.
The court also noted that the ban affected only plastic milk containers and not nonreturnable,
nonrefillable paper milk containers. Id.
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related to the state interests in conservation or solid waste management." 4
The court reached its conclusion based on the trial court's evaluation of
conflicting evidence and its own independent evaluation of the testimony,
rather than on the evidence presented to the legislature." 5 Because the case
arose under the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court
had jurisdiction over the matter and reversed the Minnesota court's decision
on appeal."
6
Two years later, in 1981, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Wegan v.
Village of Lexington"7 rejected federal equal protection analysis under the
state Equal Protection Clause."' The court in Wegan announced a three-
114. Id. at 82, 86-87.
115. Id. at 82. The Clover Leaf court claimed that the classification would not achieve
the statute's purpose. Id. But, the court based its decision entirely on evidence not presented
to the legislature. Id. at 81-82. Therefore, the court was not even evaluating the rationality of
the legislature's decision in enacting the ban. Id. at 87. Moreover, as Justice Wahl demonstrated
in his dissent, although the ban may not have covered all possible containers which the
legislature could have banned, the decision to adopt a piecemeal solution to an economic or
environmental problem lies within the proper ambit of legislative authority. Id. Wahl also
noted that in traditional rational basis review, the United States Supreme Court has declared
that the step-by-step approach in economic regulation is a permissible exercise of legislative
power. Id. at 88 (citing New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976)). Nevertheless, the Clover
Leaf court disregarded Wahl's admonition to follow traditional equal protection review and
invalidated that statute based on the majority's opinion regarding the evidence presented to
the trial court. Id. at 82.
116. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469 (1980) (holding that
Minnesota Supreme Court erred by substituting its judgment for that of legislature). The
Supreme Court in overruling the Minnesota court's invalidation of the statute noted that the
State presented four different justifications for the classification. Id. at 465. The Court found
that the legislature could have rationally believed that the classification would promote the
statute's purpose. Id. at 466-70. Therefore, the classification was valid under traditional
rational basis review. Id. at 470. After concluding that the legislature acted rationally, the
Court assailed the Minnesota Supreme Court's mode of analysis. Id. at 470. According to the
Court, the Minnesota court had in effect held that the state legislature "misunderstood the
facts." Id. at 469. The United States Supreme Court, however, flatly rejected the Minnesota
court's review standard stating that "it is not the function of the courts to substitute their
evaluation of legislative facts for that of the legislature." Id. at 470.
117. 309 N.W.2d 273 (Minn. 1981).
118. See Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 281 (Minn. 1981) (invalidating
classifications between individuals injured by unlawfully intoxicating liquor sales and unlawful
nonintoxicating liquor sales). In Wegan, the court considered whether commencement-of-suit
and notice-of-claim provisions in a state statute which distinguished intoxicating from nonin-
toxicating liquors violated the Equal Protection Clauses of both the United States Constitution
and the Minnesota Constitution. Id. at 277. The statute in Wegan, MINN. STAT. § 340.951
(1974), required claimants filing suit against an intoxicating liquor dealer to file a notice of
claim with the dealer and bring suit within one year. Id. at 278. However, claimants suing a
nonintoxicating liquor retailer did not have to file a notice of claim with the retailer and had
six years to bring the action. Id. The court began its analysis by determining that the statute
essentially created two distinct classes: individuals injured by illegal intoxicating liquor sales
and individuals injured by illegal nonintoxicating liquor sales. Id. The court then determined
that although the statute attempted to achieve legitimate government purposes, the classifica-
tions were not genuine or substantial and were historical anachronisms. Id. at 280. Therefore
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prong rational basis test for equal protection challenges arising under the
state constitution. 119 First, to satisfy the Minnesota rational basis test, the
distinction separating those within the classification from those outside the
classification must not be manifestly arbitrary or fanciful.12 0 The distinction
must be genuine and substantial, thereby providing a reasonable basis for
the purpose of the law.' 2' Second, the classification must be relevant to the
purpose of the law. 2 2 Third, the purpose of the law must be legitimate.'2
The Minnesota rational basis test, therefore, requires inquiry into the actual
effect of the challenged governmental action and not just a hypothetical
inquiry.124 By basing its decision on state constitutional grounds, the Min-
nesota court effectively removed its decision from the ambit of the United
States Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.'25
the distinction was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and under the Minnesota Constitution, article one, § 2. Id. at 281. In a footnote, however,
the court stated that even if the classifications would satisfy the federal equal protection
standard, they would still violate the state equal protection guarantee. Id. at 281 n.14.
By announcing that the statutory classifications would be invalid under the state consti-
tution regardless of their validity under the Fourteenth Amendment, the court prevented the
United States Supreme Court from overruling its decision. See McKnight, supra note 25, at
736 (acknowledging that United States Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction over state court
decisions resting on independent state grounds). Moreover, by stating that the classification
might still pass muster under federal standards but not state analysis, the court acknowledged
for the first time that the state and federal equal protection standards were different. Wegan,
309 N.W.2d at 281 n.14.
119. Wegan, 309 N.W.2d at 280. The court borrowed the three-part rational basis test
enunciated in Guilliams v. Commissioner of Revenue, 299 N.W.2d 138, 142 (Minn. 1980).
Guilliams was a state uniformity clause decision. The Uniformity Clause of the Minnesota
Constitution, article X, § 1 (1857, amended 1974) provides in pertinent part that "[tiaxes shall
be uniform upon the same class of subjects and shall be levied and collected for public
purposes .... "
The test in Guilliams requires that:
(1) The distinctions which separate those included within the classification from
those excluded must not be manifestly arbitrary or fanciful but must be genuine and
substantial, thereby providing a natural and reasonable basis to justify legislation
adapted to peculiar conditions and needs; (2) the classification must be genuine or
relevant to the purpose of the law; that is there must be an evident connection
between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the prescribed remedy; (3) the
purpose of the statute must be one that the state can legitimately attempt to achieve.
Guilliams, 299 N.W.2d at 142 (citing Miller Brewing Co. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 353, 356
(Minn. 1979)).




124. See McKnight, supra note 24, at 726 (discussing how Wegan court examined actual
effect of statute not just conceivable or possible bases for law). McKnight argues that the
court's analysis in Wegan was a sharp break from traditional rational basis analysis. Id.
Previously, the Minnesota Supreme Court traditionally determined whether facts existed upon
which the legislature could arguably have based its decision in creating a classification. Id. In
Wegan, though, the court refused to hypothesize possible explanations but evaluated the actual
effects instead. Id.
125. See Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95
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Later in 1981, the Minnesota court decided another case on state equal
protection grounds similar to the analysis used in Wegan. 26 In Nelson v.
Peterson'27 the court invalidated a statute that prohibited state-employed
attorneys who represented petitioners in workers' compensation cases from
being workers' compensation judges. 28 The court in Nelson applied the
same three-prong rational basis test that it had used in Wegan.'29 Under the
three-prong analysis the court determined that the statutory classification
between state-employed attorneys who represent petitioners and state-em-
ployed attorneys who represent defendants was not genuine or relevant to
the purposes'30 of the statute.' 3 ' The court reached its conclusion by rejecting
all of the state's arguments supporting the classification. 3 2 Before rejecting
Hiv. L. Rv. 1324, 1332-34 (1982) [hereinafter State Rights] (describing limitations on United
States Supreme Court's jurisdiction over decisions resting on independent state grounds);
McKnight, supra note 25, at 736 (stating that United States Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction
over cases that state courts decide on state grounds); Zollar, supra note 29, at 509-10 (stating
that United States Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review state interpretations resting on
independent grounds).
126. McKnight, supra note 24, at 728.
127. 313 N.W.2d 580 (Minn. 1981).
128. Nelson v. Peterson, 313 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Minn. 1981) (holding statute that prohibited
state-employed attorneys from serving as workers' compensation judges to be violative of state
equal protection). In Nelson, the court considered a statute that excluded state-employed
attorneys who represented petitioners in workers' compensation cases from becoming compen-
sation judges until two years after the attorney last represented a petitioner but placed no
similar restriction on state-employed defense attorneys. Id. at 580-81. In Nelson, state-employed
attorneys brought suit to have the statutory provision restricting them from serving as
compensation judges declared unconstitutional under both state and federal equal protection
guarantees. Id. at 580. The court first determined that the appropriate standard for review
was the Guilliams three-part rational basis test. Id. at 581. After determining that the statute's
purpose was legitimate, thereby satisfying the third requirement of the Guilliams test, the court
declared that the means chosen to achieve the statute's purposes were irrational. Id. at 582.
The State presented three possible arguments to establish a conceivable basis for the distinction
in the statute, but the court rejected all three. Id. at 582-83. One of the arguments was that
the legislature intended to broaden the backgrounds and experiences of compensation judges
because currently every compensation judge had worked as petitioners attorneys in compen-
sation cases. Id. at 581-82. The court invalidated the statute by reviewing the actual effect of
the statute and not any hypothetical explanations for the classifications. Id. at 583.
129. Id. at 581.
130. Id. at 582. The state offered two reasons for the classification. First, the state
claimed that the classification helped to eliminate any appearance that compensation judges
were biased in favor of employees. Id. Second, the state argued that the prohibition on state-
employed petitioners' attorneys from serving as compensation judges would broaden the
experiences and backgrounds of compensation judges. Id. The court agreed that both justifi-
cations for the statute were legitimate purposes, and therefore the classification satisfied the
third prong of the three-prong rational basis test. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 582-83. The state first argued that the legislature reasonably could have believed
that the excluded attorneys were more likely than the exempted attorneys to be biased. Id. at
582. The state next argued that the legislature may have thought the statute would increase
public confidence in the workers' compensation system. Id. at 583. Finally, the state claimed
that the legislature enacted the statute to increase the diversity of experience and backgrounds
the workers' compensation judges in the state. Id.
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the state's possible justifications for the classification, the court closely
examined the actual effect of the statute and required that the classification
actually achieve the legislative purpose.'33 The court's analysis, therefore,
more closely resembled an independent evaluation of legislative determina-
tions rather than rational basis review.1
34
The Minnesota Supreme Court expanded its independent evaluation of
legislative decisions in state equal protection challenges to the criminal
context in State v. Russell. 35 The court decided Russell by using the
substantive rational basis approach from Wegan.136 In Russell, the govern-
ment charged five African-American defendants under Minnesota Statutes
section 152.023(2)(1)137 with possession of three or more grams of crack
cocaine.138 The defendants moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that
the statute had a discriminatory impact on African-Americans and violated
both state and federal equal protection guarantees. 39 At the time of the
defendants' arrests, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provided for a
maximum sentence of twenty years in prison for possession of three grams
of crack cocaine, although possession of the same amount of powder cocaine
carried a maximum penalty of only five years.'40 Moreover, the statute
required that a person possess ten grams of powder cocaine to be guilty of
the same offense level as a person possessing three grams of crack cocaine . "4
133. See McKnight, supra note 25, at 729 (arguing that court in Nelson applied standard
of review different from traditional rational basis test and stricter than federal standard).
134. Nelson v. Peterson, 313 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Minn. 1981) (Sheran, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Sheran, joined by Justice Peterson, dissented on the grounds that the court
substituted its evaluation of a legislative decision for the legislature's. Id. Sheran asserted that
deference to the legislature was particularly appropriate in a case such as Nelson in which the
law was a product of compromise and agreement in the legislature. Id. Sheran also noted that
the legislature had proper authority to determine the reasonable qualifications of compensation
judges. Id. Finally, the Chief Justice concluded that the legislature acted reasonably in seeking
to diversify the backgrounds of compensation judges. Id. Therefore, Sheran claimed that the
court should have deferred to the legislature and not imposed its own evaluation of the
classification upon the legislature. Id.
135. 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1991).
136. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991) (quoting Guilliams v. Commis-
sioner of Revenue, 299 N.W.2d 138, 142 (1980)).
137. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.023, subd. 2(1) (West 1989). Subdivision 2(1) provided: "A
person is guilty of controlled substance crime in the third degree if [the person] unlawfully
possesses one or more mixtures of a total weight of three grams or more containing cocaine
base."
138. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 887.
139. Id. at 887.
140. MIN. STAT. ANN. § 152.023 subd. 3(a) (West 1989). Subdivision 3(a) provided: "A
person convicted under subdivision 1 or 2 [of the statute] may be sentenced to imprisonment
for not more than twenty years or to payment of a fine of not more than $250,000, or both."
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the presumptive sentence for possession of three grams of
crack was an executed 48 months in prison while the presumptive sentence for an equal amount
of powder was a stayed 12 month sentence. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 887.
141. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 152.023 subd. 2(2) (West 1989). Subdivision 2(2) provided that
a person was guilty of a controlled substance crime in the third degree if "the person unlawfully
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The defendants argued that under the sentencing scheme a far greater
percentage of African-Americans received more severe sentences than their
Caucasian counterparts. 142 The trial court found that based on arrest records,
African-Americans comprised 96.6% of the persons charged with possession
of crack cocaine while Caucasians comprised 79.6% of all persons charged
with possession of powder cocaine. 43 Based on those records, the trial court
determined that the sentencing distinction resulted in a discriminatory impact
on African-Americans.'"4 The trial court then concluded that no rational
basis existed to support the distinction between crack cocaine and powder
cocaine for sentencing purposes. 4- The trial court also decided that the
statute violated both federal and state equal protection guarantees and
therefore granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. 46 The trial court then
certified the issue to the Minnesota Court of Appeals. 47 Subsequently, the
Minnesota Supreme Court granted a joint petition for accelerated review of
the constitutionality of the classification.'
41
The Minnesota Supreme Court began its analysis by declaring that the
statute failed to satisfy state equal protection guarantees.' 49 However, the
court did not address whether the classification would pass muster under
the federal Constitution.'10 Although the court acknowledged its past incon-
sistency in applying the state rational basis standard, 5' it maintained that
it had been consistent in its refusal to adopt a "hypothetical" approach to
its rational basis test.1 2 The court claimed that in state equal protection
analysis it had required a reasonable connection between the actual, and
not just the theoretical, effects of the classification and the statute's pur-
pose."' Based on this analysis, the court invalidated the statute under
possesses one or more mixtures of a total weight of ten grams or more containing a narcotic
drug."
Although subdivision 2(2) did not refer specifically to cocaine powder, the definition of
"narcotic drug" included cocaine powder. Mi4N. STAT. ANN. § 152.01, subd. 10(1) (1989).
142. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 887 (1991). The defendants based their argument
on the determination that African-Americans were the predominant users of crack cocaine
while Caucasians primarily used powder. Id. Therefore, more African-Americans received
longer sentences for cocaine possession. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court did not, however, detail the trial court's reasoning




149. Id. at 888.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 889.
152. Id.
153. Id. The Russell court's contention that it has been unwilling to hypothesize possible
rational bases for classifications applies only since 1979 when the court refused to hypothesize
about a possible rational relationship in Clover Leaf. Id. Prior to 1979, the court had engaged
in traditional equal protection analysis. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (citing pre-
1979 cases following traditional rational basis test).
1993] 1809
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1791
Minnesota's heightened rational basis standard, although it also asserted
that the statistically disparate impact could support an inference of invidious
discrimination that would trigger strict scrutiny.
1 4
After declaring that no barriers prevented the court from adopting a
more stringent rational basis standard' s' than that employed by the federal
courts, the court determined that when a classification imposed a substan-
tially disproportionate burden on the class that inspired the principles of
equal protection, the court should apply the more stringent rational basis
test. 156 The court invalidated the statute under Minnesota's three-part height-
ened rational basis test.157 In striking down the statute, the court indepen-
dently evaluated the legislative testimony that had encouraged the legislature
to create the distinction between crack and powder cocaine for sentencing
purposes.'
5'
The court found that the classification failed the first prong of the
Minnesota rational basis standard. The first prong requires that the distinc-
tion which separates those within the classification from those outside not
be manifestly arbitrary or fanciful, but instead be genuine and substantial
and provide a reasonable basis to justify legislation adopted to address
peculiar conditions and needs. 5 9 According to the Russell majority, the
distinction failed for lack of a genuine and substantial distinction between
those within the class and those outside the class.'60
In deciding Russell, the Minnesota Supreme Court declared that the
state must provide more than anecdotal support for the distinction in order
154. State v. Russell, 477 N.W. 2d 886, 888 n.2 (1991). The court stated that it could
have inferred purposeful discrimination from the gross disparity thereby triggering strict
scrutiny. Id. However, the court refused to adopt that approach, but opted instead to apply
the rational basis test in which the court substituted its judgment for that of the legislature.
Id.
155. See id. at 889 (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461
n.6 (1980)). In Clover Leaf, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that state courts
may apply more stringent equal protection review standards under state equal protection clauses
if they wished to do so. Clover Leaf, 449 U.S. at 461 n.6; see also Robert F. Williams,
Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 Tax. L. Rav. 1195, 1222-24 (1985)
(arguing that state courts should develop equal protection standards under state constitutions
independent of federal standards).
156. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889. The majority was referring to the fact that African-
Americans inspired the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 889-91.
159. Id. at 889.
160. Id. The court's use of the terms "genuine" and "substantial" are particularly
troublesome. Since the court began using the Guilliams three-part analysis, the court has never
defined what "genuine" or "substantial" mean. See supra notes 120-34 and accompanying
text (discussing Minnesota Supreme Court's application of the Guilliams test). Rather, the
court's use of those terms rather than the traditional rational basis terms indicates that the
court engages in independent assessments of evidence irrespective of legislative determinations.
Id.; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Supreme Court's use of phrase "substantially related" in intermediate scrutiny is too diaph-
anous and elastic and will permit judiciary to substitute its judgment for legislature's).
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to satisfy the genuine and substantial requirement.' 6' The state asserted the
classification's purpose was to help facilitate the prosecution of street level
drug dealers.16z According to evidence before the legislature, mere drug
users rarely ever possess more than three grams of crack. 63 Therefore, the
state argued that the legislature enacted the three grams of crack and ten
grams of powder classification to deter street level drug dealing rather than
mere possession. 164
The Russell court concluded that the primary evidence before the
legislature was purely anecdotal and not substantial and genuine. 65 Mr.
James Kamin from the Hennepin County Attorney's Office provided the
primary testimony to support the state's claim.'6 The court decided that
the testimony of one expert witness was insufficient to support a sentencing
distinction that resulted in a statistically disparate racial impact. 67
The court in Russell then rejected the state's second basis for the
distinction. 68 The state argued that crack was more addictive and dangerous
than powder. 69 The court again independently reviewed the testimony
presented to the state legislature and concluded that the evidence supporting
crack's greater addictiveness and dangerousness'70 failed to establish a gen-
uine and substantial distinction between those within the class and those
outside the class. 17
1
161. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (1991). The court failed to define what would
constitute more than "anecdotal" evidence. Id. For example, the court rejected the testimony
which supported the State's assertion that the statute was designed to curb street level drug
dealing because only one expert witness presented the testimony to the legislature. Id. at 890.
The court did not indicate how many experts or what type of evidence would have sufficed
to satisfy the "anecdotal" requirement. Id. at 889-90.
162. Id. at 889.
163. Id. at 899"n.8 (Coyne, J., dissenting). Indeed, the legislative testimony also indicated
that street level drug dealers rarely ever carried more than three grams of crack. Id. Instead,
police usually found amounts exceeding three grams in raids of dealers at crack houses. Id.
164. Id. at 889.
165. Id. at 889-90.
166. Id. at 889. The court did not provide Mr. Kamin's qualifications. Id.
167. Id. According to the court, Mr. Kamin's only support for his assertion that the
legislature chose the three gram amount to target street level drug dealers came from his
conversations with police officers, informants and persons convicted of drug offenses. Id. The
court determined that such testimony, unsupported by a study, was insufficient to satisfy the
"more than anecdotal" requirement. Id. Whether one expert's testimony supported by one
study would have satisfied the court is still debatable. Moreover, the court failed to elaborate
on whether there were other experts who testified before the legislature. Id. at 889-90.
168. Id. at 890.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 897 (Coyne, J., dissenting). Justice Coyne pointed out that the evidence Dawn
Speier presented to the legislature indicated that crack delivers a concentrated dose of cocaine
to the brain, at least three times that of snorting powder. Id. Coyne also pointed to other
evidence which similarly indicated that crack is both more addictive and more dangerous than
powder. Id. at 897 n.4. The point of Coyne's argument was not that the testimony conclusively
demonstrated the government's contention, but merely that the evidence provided a rational
basis for the legislature's decision, even if the majority thought the legislature misunderstood
the weight of the evidence. Id. at 902.
171. Id. at 890.
1993]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1791
On the issue of crack's more addictive and dangerous quality, the court
noted that the primary testimony before the legislature was from one police
officer. 72 Such evidence did not rise to the level of genuine and substantial.
Similarly, the court reviewed the trial court testimony of a chemist, Dawn
Speier. 171 Speier testified that the differences in effect resulted from the
mode of ingestion. Moreover, Speier testified that cocaine is the mood
altering ingredient in both crack and powder.1 7 4 Finally, she testified that
powder cocaine can be dissolved in water and taken intravenously resulting
in effects similar to smoking crack.175 Based on that admission, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court concluded that Speier's testimony was merely anec-
dotal and did not support the distinction.1 76
The court also rejected the state's contention that more violence is
associated with the use of crack cocaine than with the use of powder.177
According to the court, other factors such as gang warfare could explain
the increased violence, rather than the pharmacological effects of crack. 7 1
The court then admitted that under traditional rational basis review, it
could not second-guess the legislature's determinations of fact. 79 Under the
172. Id. The court criticized the police officer's testimony because he did not profess to
be a trained scientist. Id. Whether the court's evaluation of his testimony would have been
different if he had been a scientist, however, is highly unlikely based on the courts rejection
of a chemist's similar testimony.
173. Id. at 890. After reviewing Speier's scientific testimony, the court acknowledged that
"under the more deferential rational basis test we may not second guess the scientific accuracy
of legislative determinations of fact absent overwhelming contrary evidence." Id. Nevertheless,
under the Minnesota test, the court second-guessed the legislature's judgment even though the
contrary evidence was not overwhelming. Id. The court, however, in a footnote recognized
that the legislature had recently decided to reinvestigate the crack-powder distinction. Id. at
890 n.6. Rather than await a legislative re-evaluation, the court weighed the evidence itself
and reached a decision for the legislature.
174. Id. at 890.
175. Id. Although the court rejected much of Speier's testimony, the court accepted her
testimony that different methods of ingesting powder cocaine can be as dangerous as crack
cocaine. Id. The court also accepted Speier's assertion that nine grams of 90% pure powder
cocaine converts into a little over eight grams of crack. Id. at 891 n.7.
176. Id. at 890.
177. Id.
178. Id. The court failed to articulate why the government's explanation for the increased
association of violence with crack use was irrelevant to the creation of the crack-powder
distinction. Id. A logical response to the court's assertion would be that if more violence is
associated with crack use, the exact cause of the violence should be unimportant. Instead, the
important fact would be that, for whatever reason, crack use is associated with increased
violence. Therefore, because crack use is associated with more violence than is the use of
powder, the greater association itself would seem to provide a reasonable basis for the
distinction and therefore satisfy the first prong of the Minnesota rational basis test. See
"'Crack" Cocaine: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate
Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1986) (statement of Sen. Sam Nunn)
(arguing that crack cocaine is unprecedented threat to United States); id. (statement of Sen.
Lawton Chiles) (claiming that crack use leaves more carnage in its wake than use of any other
drug).
179. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. 1991).
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Minnesota test, however, the court concluded that the legislative evidence
indicating that more violence is associated with crack use was insufficient
to establish a genuine and substantial distinction between crack and powder
cocaine. 80
The Russell court also concluded that the crack-powder distinction failed
the second requirement of the Minnesota test.' Under the second prong
of the Minnesota rational basis test, the classification must be genuine or
relevant to the purpose of the law.8 2 In other words, an evident connection
between the distinctive needs peculiar to the class and the prescribed remedy
must exist.' In Russell, the court decided that the evidence did not support
the classification.8 4 The court based its decision primarily on what it
considered a dearth of evidence to support the state's claim that street level
drug dealing generally took place when an individual possessed ten grams
of powder or three grams of crack.'85 Additionally, the court determined
that the distinction was arbitrary because one expert witness testified that
ten grams of powder could be converted into more than three grams of
crack.
16
Finally, the majority found that the state-employed means were illegit-
imate and violative of the third prong of the state equal protection test.8 7
Under the third prong of the Minnesota test, the purpose of the statute
must be one the state legitimately could attempt to achieve.' According to
the court, the statute created an impermissible presumption of intent to sell
once the individual possessed either three grams of crack or ten grams of
powder.8 9 The sentencing scheme punished an individual for possession
with intent to sell without the prosecution's proving that the individual
intended to distribute crack or powder.' 9° Instead, the prosecution need
prove only that the individual possessed the requisite amount of cocaine,
thereby creating an irrebuttable presumption of intent to distribute.' 9' The
180. Id.
181. Id. at 891.
182. Id. at 888 (quoting Guilliams v. Commissioner, 299 N.W.2d 138, 142 (Minn. 1980)).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 891.
185. Id.
186. Id. Dawn Speier was the expert who claimed that removal of the hydrochloride from
nine grams of 90% pure powder cocaine could produce eight grams of crack. Id. at 891 n.7.
187. Id. at 891.
188. Id. at 888.
189. Id. at 891.
190. Id. According to the State, the statute's purpose was to punish drug dealers more
severely than mere possessors. Id. at 888. However, intent to distribute was not an element
of the offense as defined by the legislature. See Philip Leavenworth, Note, Illegal Drugs, New
Laws, and Justice: An Examination of Five Recently Enacted Minnesota Statutes, 16 Wm.
MircHELL L. REv. 499, 521-27 (1990) (describing elements of Minnesota's controlled substance
statutory provisions). Therefore, individuals convicted under this provision received sentences
designed to deter drug dealing whether or not the individual ever dealt drugs. State v. Russell,
477 N.W.2d 886, 891 (Minn. 1991).
191. MIN I. STAT. ANN. § 152.023 (West 1989). The statute defined penalties according
to amount of the substance possessed.
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Minnesota Supreme Court previously had declared that statutes which create
irrebuttable presumptions violated due process and were unconstitutional.192
The sentencing scheme was, therefore, unconstitutional under the due proc-
ess guarantees.193
Justice Yetka's concurrence adopted a slightly different approach. 194
Justice Yetka would have adopted an implied inference standard rather than
the majority's substantive equal protection approach. 9 s According to Justice
Yetka, because all the parties agreed that African-Americans constituted the
largest percentage of crack users, there should exist a presumption that the
legislature was aware of the disparate racial impact of the sentencing
scheme. 96 Despite the possible presumption of discriminatory purpose,
Justice Yetka agreed with the majority's application of the stricter rational
basis standard.
197
192. See State v. Kelly, 15 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Minn. 1944) (invalidating state statute that
created irrebuttable presumption that possession of alcohol discovered by means of search
warrant was prima facie evidence of intent to sell). In Kelly, the court maintained that
conclusive presumptions were almost always unconstitutional. Id.; see also Leavenworth, supra
note 190, at 527 n.104 (examining Minnesota cases in which Minnesota Supreme Court
invalidated irrebuttable presumptions).
193. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 891. The court could have based its decision to invalidate
the statute solely on the ground that the enactment created an unconstitutional conclusive
presumption. See Leavenworth, supra note 190, at 527-28 (noting disfavored status of irre-
buttable presumptions). Following Russell, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v.
Clausen, 493 N.W.2d 112, 117 (Minn. 1992), decided that Minnesota Statute 152.023 subd.
2(2) (West 1990) did not contain an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption. Clausen, 493
N.W.2d at 118. Rather, the court concluded that statements in Russell which implied that the
statute employed an illegitimate means that violated due process were merely dicta. Id.
Moreover, the court determined that the legislature reasonably defined the statute as a
possession crime, and therefore the statute was constitutional. Id.
194. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 891-92. Justice Yetka argued that the mode of ingestion for
the mood altering ingredient, cocaine, was irrelevant when considering appropriate penalties.
Id. at 892. According to Yetka, the intoxication was the harm, not how the means of achieving
the intoxication or even the level of intoxication. Id. To bolster his argument, Yetka compared
cocaine to alcohol. Id. Although admitting the comparison with alcohol was not completely
accurate, Yetka maintained that illegal use of alcohol, such as driving while intoxicated, did
not depend on the level or means of intoxication. Id. In other words, driving while intoxicated
after ingesting wine was just as illegal as driving while intoxicated after consuming beer or
hard liquor. Id.
The logical response to Yetka's analogy is, however, that if the mind altering substance
is irrelevant, then any sentencing scheme which sets different penalties based on the type of
substance used would be invalid. See infra notes 303-04 and accompanying text (discussing
Federal Sentencing Guidelines distinction based on harmful effects of drugs). For example,
any distinction between speed and cocaine would be invalid because both drugs are stimulants
which have similar effects on the body. See infra notes 305-07 (discussing possible invalidation
of PCP-LSD distinction and crack-ice distinction under Russell analysis).





Justice Simonett also concurred with the majority decision in Russell, 9
but sought to clarify the majority's reasoning. 199 Justice Simonett feared
that the court's opinion could open the door to increased use of substantive
due process analysis. 200 To quell that possibility, Justice Simonett proposed
that the court limit its use of the three-prong analysis to facially neutral
criminal statutes that result in discriminatory racial impact, even when the
legislature did not intend the impact.2 1 Justice Simonett further proposed
that when a facially neutral law produces an inadvertent discriminatory
impact based on race, the court should apply the rational basis test with
less deference than it generally affords legislative enactments. 2 In Russell
Justice Simonett concluded that the less deferential standard of review was
appropriate and that under that standard, the statute failed to satisfy equal
protection guarantees. 2°3
Only Justice Coyne dissented in Russell.204 Justice Coyne emphasized
that the Minnesota court, in the past, had limited its role in legislative
determinations of criminal punishments. 2 5 The dissent then advocated the
use of the more deferential federal rational basis test.2°6 Justice Coyne
contended that the court should not invoke heightened scrutiny in criminal
punishment contexts absent discriminatory intent or purpose. 207 Justice Coyne
recounted the evidence underlying the adoption of the federal Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986,20s that preceded the enactment of the Minnesota sen-
tencing scheme. 2°9 According to Coyne, the evidence presented to Congress
resulting in the 100 grams of powder to one gram of crack distinction in
the federal sentencing scheme satisfied the federal rational basis test.
210
Therefore, the Minnesota sentencing scheme should pass muster under any
rational basis test because the legislature acted rationally.
21'
Justice Coyne's main disagreement with the majority's decision centered
on the majority's independent evaluation of the testimony presented to the
198. Id. at 893.
199. Id. at 894. Justice Simonett was concerned that unless the court established a
principled approach, then the court could just substitute its own appraisal of what is rational
legislation and disregard legislative decisions. Id. Although Justice Simonett did not acknowl-
edge that was what the court in Russell actually did, his apprehension indicates he too sensed
the court was engaged in substantive equal protection review. See id. at 893-95 (Simonett, J.,
concurring) (expressing reservations about far-reaching implications of majority's ruling).
200. Id. at 894.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 895.
204. Id.
205. Id.; see also State v. Osterloh, 275 N.W.2d 578, 580 (Minn. 1978) (holding that
where legislature has power to define crimes, legislature has power to define punishments for
those crimes).
206. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 902 (Minn. 1991).
207. Id. at 896.
208. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570 § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207-12 (1986).
209. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 897 (Coyne, J., dissenting).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 898.
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legislature. 21 2 Justice Coyne compared the majority's approach with the type
of substantive review the United States Supreme Court applied in the long
since discredited 1905 Lochner v. New York decision. 213 In Lochner, the
United States Supreme Court invalidated a New York law that limited the
number of hours bakery workers could work by independently evaluating
the state's proffered justifications for the law. 214 In short, the Lochner
Court substituted its judgment regarding the wisdom of the law for that of
the legislature. 21 5 In 1937, however, the Supreme Court rejected the Lochner
substantive due process analysis in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.2 6 Since
1937, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected Lochner analysis and has
followed the Parrish decision. 2
1 7
Despite the disfavored status of Lochner analysis, according to Coyne,
the Russell majority's approach paralleled Lochner analysis. 218 Coyne argued
that the majority merely substituted its judgment of the wisdom of the
crack-powder distinction for that of the legislature under the auspices of
rational basis review. 219 Coyne demonstrated how the majority substituted
its assessment of the evidence presented to the legislature by recounting
testimony supporting the legislature's decision that the majority simply
disregarded without any mention. 220 Coyne ultimately concluded that the
212. Id. at 902.
213. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905) (invalidating New York law
which limited hours bakery workers could work to 60 hours per week as having no rational
relation to employee health). In Lochner, the Court considered whether a New York law
limiting the number of hours bakery workers could work to 60 hours a week was rationally
related to the state's purpose of promoting employee health. Id. at 52. The petitioner in
Lochner appealed his conviction for wrongfully permitting an employee to work more than
60 hours a week in his bakery and argued that the statute violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 46, 52-53. The Court began its analysis by acknowledging
that the state, in the exercise of its police powers, may adopt measures to protect the health
and safety of the public. Id. at 53. The Court noted, however, that the Fourteenth Amendment
placed a limit on the valid exercise of state police powers. Id. According to the majority, the
Fourteenth Amendment required that when the state placed affirmative limits on an individual's
personal liberty to enter into employment contracts, the limits must be reasonably related to
a legitimate state interest. Id. at 54. The Court then evaluated the state's proffered justification
of the limitation and determined that there was no reasonable ground for the legislation. Id.
at 57. Although the Court independently reviewed the state's justification for the legislation,
the majority denied that it was simply substituting its judgment for that of the legislature. Id.
at 56-57. Nevertheless, Justice Holmes in dissent argued that the majority was merely imposing
its own laissez faire economic theory for the regulatory economic judgment of the state
legislature. Id. at 75. According to Holmes, such a substitution of economic theories by the
judiciary was an invalid exercise of judicial review. Id. at 76.
214. Id. at 64-65.
215. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
216. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
217. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (rejecting Lochner substantive
review analysis); McKnight, supra note 25, at 733 (noting that since 1937 Supreme Court has
discredited Lochner).
218. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 902 (Minn. 1991) (Coyne, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 902. Justice Coyne comnented that "[t]he majority's denigration of the
testimony differs little ... from a reviewing court's setting aside a jury's determination of
credibility." Id.
220. Id. at 897-902.
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majority replaced the appropriate rational basis standard of review with no
standard whatsoever' 21
In rejecting the federal rule of requiring proof of discriminatory intent
before invoking heightened scrutiny, 2 the majority did not provide any
guidance as to the circumstances in which the court would invoke this
heightened scrutiny in the future.m The court seemed to limit application
of its analysis to situations in which the challenged classification imposes a
substantially disproportionate impact, but the court failed to clarify what
would constitute substantial. 224 Moreover, the court did not limit its potential
for review of testimony presented to the legislature and did not explain
what evidence might satisfy the more-than-anecdotal hurdle.m
Because the court did not provide significant limitations to its equal
protection approach, the possibility remains that the court might apply its
heightened rational basis scrutiny analysis to other aspects of the criminal
justice system.? 6 Since Russell, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Mitchell
v. Steffen227 has determined that the Russell court's stricter standard of
rational basis review applies to any case arising under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Minnesota Constitution.m Similarly, other courts may find
the Minnesota Supreme Court's reasoning persuasive and apply the Russell
analysis to facially neutral policies that result in disproportionate impacts
on minorities?29 For instance, some judges in the Eighth Circuit have
indicated a strong desire to adopt the Russell approach at least in cases
involving the crack-powder distinction in the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines. 20 The Russell court's approach could, therefore, raise serious questions
221. Id. at 902.
222. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing requirements for strict
scrutiny review under federal equal protection analysis).
223. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888-89. The majority merely stated that in Russell every
reason existed to apply an independent state equal protection standard and that the Minnesota
test differed from the federal test. Id.
224. Id. at 889-. The court simply stated that invocation of the state standard was
particularly appropriate under these circumstances. Id. The court did not indicate whether that
statement should be seen as a limitation on the use of substantive review. Id.
225. See supra notes 163-80 and accompanying text (reviewing court's evaluation of
legislative testimony and criticizing court for not sufficiently revealing its analysis or require-
ments).
226. See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991) (stating that Minnesota's
equal protection rational basis test is different from federal rational basis test, thereby implying
that application of Minnesota test is appropriate in all equal protection challenges that require
invocation of rational basis test).
227. 487 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
228. Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896, 904 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
229. See State Rights, supra note 125, at 1328-29 (noting increased reliance on state
constitutions rather than federal doctrines to invalidate classifications); Williams, supra note
154, at 1216 (noting that since 1970 many state courts have been willing to interpret state
constitutions to invalidate classifications that would be valid under federal equal protection).
230. See United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220, 1226 (8th Cir. 1992) (Heaney, J. & Lay,
J., concurring) (stating that if they were not bound by federal precedents they would be willing
to invalidate crack-powder distinction by closely examining evidence on which Congress based
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about other aspects of the criminal justice system in which statistically
disparate impacts exist but evidence of discriminatory purpose is wanting. 2'
The discriminatory impact problem is a problem. However, the discrim-
inatory impact problem is a dilemma the legislature, not the judiciary,
should address. 2s2 An examination of the possible implications of the Russell
substantive equal protection review analysis will illustrate that the approach
is an inappropriate exercise of judicial review and will demonstrate that the
legislature is best suited to eliminate any policies that are discriminatory.
III. MINNESOTA EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS APPLIED
Because statistics tend to indicate racially disparate impacts exist in
almost every aspect of the criminal justice system from arrest through
sentencing, those procedures could be subject to the Minnesota court's
analysis. 233 In Russell, the threshold factor in finding that the crack-powder
distinction violates equal protection guarantees was that the distinction




Therefore, under the Russell rationale, a court could invalidate almost any





Arrest procedures and policies are aspects of the criminal justice system
that a court could invalidate under Russell analysis. In many respects, common
arrest procedures that are not discriminatory in design nevertheless disparately
its decision); United States v. Simmons, 964 F.2d 763, 767 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating willingness
to follow State v. Russell). The willingness of federal judges to follow Russell tends to indicate
the potential persuasiveness of the Russell decision.
231. See infra notes 236-317 and accompanying text (examining possible implications of
substantive equal protection approach on other aspects of criminal justice system).
232. See infra notes 327-33 and accompanying text (arguing that legislature, not judiciary,
should act to eradicate disparate impact problems).
233. See Morris, supra note 13, at 112 (arguing that measurable skewing against minorities
exists throughout criminal justice system); Curriden, supra note 15, at D1 (citing National
Commission on Crime and Justice report that indicates that persons of color receive disparate
and disadvantageous treatment at every stage of criminal process); Laurie Goodstein, Panel's
Report on Racism in N.Y. Courts Draws Praise; Other States, D.C. Investigating Judicial
Systems for Signs of Discrimination Inequity, WASH. POST, June 8, 1991, at A7 (citing New
York commission's study that found two-tier system of justice that discriminates against
minorities).
234. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. 1991).
235. Id. The Russell court stated the application of the Minnesota rational basis test was
appropriate in Russell because of the significance of the disparate burden on African-Americans.
Id. A logical inference to make from that statement is that any time a policy results in a
substantial burden, then substantive equal protection review should be applicable. Thus, once
the threshold requirement is satisfied, the court could engage in the substantive evaluation of
the evidence supporting the classifications. See supra notes 223-31 (discussing possible appli-
cation of Minnesota three-prong analysis following finding of substantial burden).
1818
SUBSTANTIVE EQUAL PROTECTION
impact racial minorities.736 For example, police policies designed to implement
the war on drugs have a more significant impact on minority neighborhoods
than on Caucasian neighborhoods. 237 Although studies indicate that Cauca-
sians are the overwhelming majority of the drug consumers and dealers in
this country, minorities occupy the majority of the entries on police arrest
blotters for drug offenses. " s Part of the reason for the disproportionate
number of minority arrests is that the police target minority neighborhoods 239
and use drug courier profiles,m which mainly consist of minority attributes,
when making drug arrests. Indeed, police departments across the country
frequently use street-sweeping operations that focus on minority neighbor-
236. See United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220, 1226 (8th Cir. 1992) (Heaney, J.,
dissenting) (noting that crack raids target African-American homes and not suburban Caucasian
neighborhoods); see also Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal
Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 2245, 2320 (1992) (citing studies that indicate African-Americans
comprise 90% of drug arrestees but only 12% of country's drug users); Tracey L. McCain,
The Interplay of Editorial and Prosecutorial Discretion in the Perpetuation of Racism in the
Criminal Justice System, 25 CoLtum. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 601, 602 n.5 (1992) (citing evidence
that indicates that police subject minorities to greater scrutiny which contributes to higher
arrest rates); Morris, supra note 13, at 112 (stating that. African-Americans arrest rate is at
least twice as great as Caucasian arrest rate); Powell & Hershenov, supra note 13, at 561-62
(arguing that drug war has essentially made minority communities militarized zones).
237. See Baum, supra note 13, at 886 (claiming that war on drugs is designed to harass
minorities); Boldt, supra note 236, at 2319 (arguing that war on drugs has become war on
minorities because people of color are targets of that war); Developments, supra note 13, at
1496 (maintaining that police use race as significant factor in determining whom to arrest);
Powell & Hershenov, supra note 13, at 559 (calling war on drugs a war on minorities); Ronald
J. Ostrow, U.S. Imprisons Black Men at 4 Times S. Africa's Rate; Crime: Overall American
Incarceration Leads the World. In the Past Decade it Overtook the Soviet Union, L.A. Tms,
Jan. 5, 1991, at Al (indicating statistics which demonstrate that war on drugs has affected
minorities more than Caucasians).
238. See Boldt, supra note 236, at 2320 (citing National Institute on Drug Abuse statistics
which indicate that African-Americans comprise only 12% of this country's drug users); Philip
M. Gleason et al., Drug and Alcohol Use at Work: A Survey of Young Workers; National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 114 MoNThLY LAB. REv. 3 (1991) (citing study that indicated
that Caucasians used drugs in workplace at rate 50%0 greater than minority drug use rates);
Powell & Hershenov, supra note 13, at 568 (stating that African-Americans comprise 80% to
90% of drug related prosecutions); Allan Ellis, Of Race and Incarceration, THE RECORDER,
Dec. 5, 1991, at 6 (citing statistics which demonstrate that although African-Americans make
up only 12% of all drug users, they account for 44% of all drug possession arrests); Ron
Harris, Blacks Feel Brunt of Drug War, L.A. Tuss, Apr. 22, 1990, at Al (citing FBI and
National Institute for Drug Abuse studies showing African-Americans comprise only 12% of
drug users).
239. See Boldt, supra note 236, at 2321-22 n.302 (arguing that war on cocaine did not
become popular until crack cocaine became available to inner city African-Americans); Joseph
L. Galloway et al., A Bleak Indictment of the Inner City, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar.
12, 1990, at 14 (noting that war on drugs focuses mainly on inner cities which are populated
primarily by minorities); Harris, supra note 238, at Al (citing police efforts to enforce drug
laws by targeting minority neighborhoods and not Caucasian neighborhoods).
240. See Developments, supra note 13, at 1503 (discussing police use of race as factor in
probable cause determination and as exclusive basis for surveillance); Powell & Hershenov,
supra note 13, at 583-84, 613 (discussing police use of race in drug courier profile determi-
nations).
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hoods to arrest drug dealers. 241 The primary reason police target minority
drug dealing is that minorities are easier to arrest because they deal drugs in
the open whereas most Caucasian drug deals occur behind closed doors in
homes or offices.2A2 Moreover, police also target minority drug dealers because
more violence is associated with minority drug dealing than with Caucasian
drug dealing.243
Russell analysis could invalidate these policies as violative of the arrestees'
equal protection rights.? Because statistics demonstrate that African-Ameri-
cans and other minorities are not the primary drug users or dealers but do
comprise the overwhelming number of drug arrestees,25 one could argue that
arrest policies disparately burden minorities.? Consequently, the statistics
could suffice to satisfy the threshold requirement of the Russell test. 7
After determining that a substantial disparate impact exists, the court
would subject the arrest policies to the three-part Russell test.2 Just as in
Russell, a primary objective of the police procedures that target minority
neighborhoods is to facilitate the prosecution of drug dealers.? 9 The court in
Russell concluded the evidence presented to the legislature did not support
sufficiently the claim that the classifications would further facilitate drug
dealer prosecutions. 0 Similarly, a court using the Russell analysis could
conclude that current police policies do not satisfactorily result in the prose-
241. See Powell & Hershenov, supra note 13, at 613-14 (citing examples of how police
use of street sweep operations focus primarily on arresting minorities); Harris, supra note 238,
at Al (citing examples of street sweeping operations in Memphis, Los Angeles, Atlanta, New
York and Chicago, all which focused on poor African-American neighborhoods).
242. See Ellis, supra note 238, at 6 (arguing that police target minorities because they are
the easiest to arrest); Harris, supra note 238, at Al (noting that minorities are more "arrestable"
because they deal drugs on street comers).
243. See Harris, supra note 238, at Al (acknowledging that one reason for targeting
minority drug dealing is that more violence is associated with minority drug dealing).
244. See supra notes 212-21 and accompanying text (discussing Minnesota court's sub-
stantive review analysis).
245. See supra note 238 (citing statistics indicating Caucasians are primary drug users but
minorities are majority of arrestees).
246. See Boldt, supra note 236, at 2321-22 (claiming racial basis underlies drug war);
Powell & Hershenov, supra note 13, at 559 (stating that minorities are real victims of war on
drugs); Ostrow supra note 237, at Al (asserting that drug war is single largest contributing
factor to increased percentage of arrested and incarcerated African-American males); Young
Black Men, N.Y. TImns, May 7, 1992, at A26 (indicating that although African-American
males constitute only 6% of United States population, they account for majority of arrestees
and 47% of prison population).
247. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (noting that Minnesota court's decision
to apply substantive review was based on substantiality of burden crack-powder distinction
imposed on African-Americans).
248. See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Minn. 1991) (describing elements of
Minnesota three-prong test).
249. Powell & Hershenov, supra note 13, at 557-58 (citing studies indicating that although
drug war targets drug dealers it has not extinguished drug trade).
250. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889-90.
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cution of drug dealers because most dealers are Caucasian. 251 Therefore, a
court could view the minority targeting policies as manifestly arbitrary by
independently weighing existing statistical evidence of arrests and drug use. 
52
Additionally, a court could conclude that the minority targeting policies do
not achieve the purpose of prosecuting drug dealers and therefore the policies
fail to satisfy the second prong of the Russell test.23
Finally, a court might determine that the arrest policies fail to meet the
third requirement of the Russell test.2  Although the eradication and prose-
cution of drug dealers might be a legitimate government purpose, in Russell,
the court concluded that the statute employed an illegitimate means to achieve
that purposeY 5 Because the statute employed an illegitimate means to achieve
a legitimate end, the statute violated the third prong of the testY
6  -
In the case of arrest procedures, a court could conclude that the street
sweeps and minority targeting policies are illegitimate means to a legitimate
end.217 For example, a court could decide that the warrantless searches, which
often coincide with these targeting procedures, violate the arrestees' Fourth
Amendment rights.35 Likewise, a court could determine that these policies
violate due process rights and therefore are illegitimate.2Y9 As in Russell, a
court could use the violation of the third prong as dictum merely to support
its invalidation of the arrest policies.2w A court could, independent of executive
251. See supra note 238 (presenting statistics which indicate that Caucasians are primary
drug users and dealers). A court could reach the conclusion that arrest policies fail to eradicate
drug dealing because some statistics indicate drug dealing has not decreased since the inception
of the drug war. See Powell & Hershenov, supra note 13, at 558 n.3 (noting statistics which
indicate drug usage not in decline).
252. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 902 (Coyne, J., dissenting). Since Russell analysis chiefly
involves the court acting as a super-legislature, the court could agree that the classification is
genuine and substantial based on its own independent evaluation of the evidence. Id. Alter-
natively, the court could independently weigh the evidence and reach the opposite conclusion.
Id.
253. See id. at 888 (stating that second element of test requires that classification be
relevant to purpose of challenged government action). There would be no guarantee that the
court would conclude that because the policies have not eradicated the drug problems, the
classification was not relevant to the policies' purpose.
254. See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 (Minn. 1991) (laying out third requirement
of three-part test).
255. But see State v. Clausen, 493 N.W.2d 113, 118 (Minn. 1992) (holding that state drug
possession law did not create impermissible conclusive presumption of intent to distribute).
256. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 891.
257. See Powell & Hershenov, supra note 13, at 1515 (arguing that police procedures
which target minority neighborhoods impermissibly use race as motivating criterion in those
policies). The goal of the street sweeping policies is to eradicate the drug problem and the
violence that is associated with drug dealing. Id.
258. See Powell & Hershenov, supra note 12, at 579-82 (noting that some courts have
upheld warrantless searches under drug exception to Fourth Amendment but arguing that
courts should invalidate searches made without warrants).
259. See id. at 582 (arguing that war on drugs threatens constitutional due process
protections).
260. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 891 (Minn. 1991).
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or legislative decisions, substitute its own judgment for that of the other
branches regarding the wisdom of these policies.261
B. Prosecutorial Discretion
Similarly, courts could use Russell analysis to overturn convictions based
on prosecutorial discretion that results in disparate racial impact. Studies
indicate that prosecutors often exercise discretion in a manner that results in
disproportionate racial impact.262 For instance, prosecutors may charge mi-
nority defendants with offenses punishable by mandatory penalties more than
they charge Caucasians with offenses punishable under mandatory sentencing
provisions. 36 Prosecutors may seek full prosecution more often when the
crime involves a Caucasian victim and a minority defendant than when the
crime involves a minority victim. Additionally, prosecutors may be more
willing to reach plea agreements with Caucasian defendants than with minority
defendants. 265 Each of these instances of discretion may disparately affect
racial minorities.
If a court concludes that the impact substantially burdens a racial
minority, then the court could subject the challenged government actions to
261. See McKnight, supra note 25, at 735 (noting that Minnesota substantive review
permits court to substitute its judgment for legislature's on issues that involve competing public
policies). McKnight, in her article, before Russell, argued that the Minnesota Supreme Court
impermissibly intruded on the powers of the legislature. Id. See also infra notes 327-33 (arguing
that legislature not judiciary is best suited to re-evaluate these criminal procedure policies).
262. See Developments, supra note 13, at 1525-29 (tracing findings of studies indicating
disparate treatment of minorities at initial stages of prosecution); McCain, supra note 236, at
638 (arguing that broad authority permits prosecutors to exercise discretion in manner which
disparately impacts African-Americans).
263. See Forer, supra note 14, at 12 (stating that prosecutors charge African-Americans
under mandatory sentencing laws more often than they do Caucasians).
264. See Developments, supra note 13, at 1525 (citing study showing prosecutors seek full
prosecution more often when victim is Caucasian); Kennedy, supra note 60, at 1396-98 (citing
Baldus study demonstrating racial bias in capital punishment); Morris, supra note 13, at 112
(citing study indicating prosecutors sought death penalty more frequently when victim was
Caucasian); Martin Dyckman, Justice Still Isn't Color-Blind, ST. PaaRSBURG TIM, Nov. 10,
1992, at 13A (citing Florida statistics indicating that killers of white victims are four times
more likely to receive death sentence than killers of minority victims); Ruth Marcus, Racial
Bias Widely Seen in Criminal Justice System; Research Often Supports Black Perceptions,
WASH. PosT, May 12, 1992, at A4 (maintaining that race of victim is important element in
determining length of defendant's sentence); Tracy Thompson, Studies Find Criminals Getting
Longer Sentences; Race Disparities Remain, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1991, at A6 (citing United
States Sentencing Commission study finding that minorities are less likely to plea bargain out
of mandatory prison sentences for drug crimes).
265. Developments, supra note 13, at 1631 n.41 (citing study demonstrating that Caucasians
are more likely to plea bargain than minorities); McCain, supra note 236, at 602 n.5 (quoting
research showing that African-Americans have fewer opportunities to plea bargain than
Caucasians); Blake Nelson, The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines: The Effects of Determinate
Sentencing on Disparities in Sentencing Decisions, 10 LAw & INEQUALITY J. 217, 223-24 n.28
(1992) (citing studies indicating discrimination has shifted from sentencing to plea bargaining
phase); Thompson, supra note 264, at A6 (citing study indicating that Caucasians are more
likely to reach plea bargains than African-Americans).
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the three-part substantive equal protection analysis.366 For example, the court
could compare prosecutors' decisions to charge minority defendants with
offenses subject to mandatory minimum penalties with the decisions not to
charge Caucasians with those offenses. 6 The court then independently could
weigh the justifications supporting the prosecutorial decisions. 2M Because the
Russell standard is not deferential to legislative or executive decisions, the
court easily could determine that the classification of those charged with
mandatory sentence crimes was arbitrary.? 9
A court also might invalidate plea agreement policies if they created a
substantially disparate impact.270 A court might decide that prosecutorial
discretion regarding plea bargaining violates equal protection guarantees. 27'
Again, the court would independently evaluate existing evidence to determine
whether the classifications of those who reach plea bargains and those who
do not are arbitrary. The court also would evaluate whether the classifications
fulfill the underlying purposes of the plea bargaining process. 272 Because a
court under the Russell approach would weigh the justifications for the
classifications independently, a court might, but would not necessarily, con-
clude that they were arbitrary or illegitimate.27"
C. Bail and Pretrial Detention
Evidence also indicates that more minority defendants than Caucasians
are unable to make bail and therefore remain in jail prior to their trials. 274
266. See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 887, 889 (Minn. 1991) (citing trial court's
finding of disparate impact and concluding that three-part test was applicable).
267. See id. at 887 (determining that statutory distinction is between individuals convicted
of crack possession and individuals convicted of powder possession).
268. See McKnight, supra note 25, at 733 (describing process of substantive review as
evaluation unaided by substantive values).
269. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 902 (Coyne, J. dissenting). The problem with permitting the
judiciary to invalidate mandatory sentencing laws is that the courts would then be intruding
upon legislative and executive decisionmaking processes and disregarding the discretion those
branches need to operate the criminal justice system. Id.
270. See supra note 265 (citing evidence showing prosecutors are more likely to reach
plea agreements with Caucasians than with minorities).
271. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 887, 889 (Minn. 1991). The threshold issue is
whether the disparate impact is substantial. Id. at 889. If so, then under Russell, the policy
is probably a violation of equal protection. Id.
272. Id. at 902 (Coyne, J., dissenting).
273. McKnight, supra note 25, at 735. One of the biggest failings of substantive review
is that the courts base their decisions on undefined principles of fairness, not on any specific
constitutional or statutory provisions. Id. Therefore, predicting exactly what interests the court
will value more highly than others is nearly impossible. Id.
274. McCain, supra note 236, at 602 n.5 (citing research which concluded that African-
Americans have fewer opportunities to post bail); Ellis, supra note 238, at 7 (citing Florida
statistics indicating discrimination in pretrial detention); Brant Houston & Jack Ewing, Blacks
and Hispanics Must Pay More to Get Out of Jail; Inequalities Are the Rule in the Bail System,
HARTFORD COURWANT, June 16, 1991, at Al (revealing findings of Connecticut study of bail
process). Houston and Ewing cite a study of Connecticut felony cases which concluded that
on average judges set bonds 84% higher for African-American men and 69% higher for
Hispanic men than for Causcasian men. Id. The study also found that judges set bonds 197
times higher for Hispanic women than Caucasian women. Id.
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Generally, bail is regarded as a means of guaranteeing attendance at trial.275
Pretrial release is also important in facilitating the best possible defense for
the defendant.276 Statistics indicate that probability of conviction increases
tremendously when a person remains in detention prior to trial. 2n Therefore,
bail-setting policies that result in the detention of more minorities will often
also result in the conviction of proportionately more minorities.28
A court could subject bail-setting policies that take into account factors
that lead to substantially more minorities remaining detained pretrial to the
Russell three-part analysis. 279 Most likely, the purposes of bail procedures are
objectives the state legitimately can hope to achieve. Therefore, the purposes
underlying bail procedures most likely satisfy the third prong of the Minnesota
test.3 Whether the factors that determine bail amount and eligibility satisfy
the other two Russell factors is more questionable.2 ' For example, the extent
and nature of the charged offense are often two key factors in bail deter-
minations.2 2 Both of those factors are most likely genuine and substantial. 3
However, courts also use employment, family ties, and connections to
the community as determinative factors. 2 Because a disproportionate number
of minority defendants are often unemployed and unmarried, those factors
will weigh against minority defendants. 2s The result could be that because of
275. See Houston & Ewing, supra note 274, at A1 (stating that purpose of bail is to
assure defendant's attendance at trial).
276. See Ellis, supra note 238, at 7 (acknowledging that defendants incarcerated pretrial
are more likely to be convicted and subsequently sentenced to imprisonment).
277. See Houston & Ewing, supra note 274, at Al (citing study showing that pretrial
incarceration correlates with higher conviction rates and longer sentences).
278. Ellis, supra note 238, at 7; Houston & Ewing, supra note 274, at Al. The conclusion
that more minority convictions result is only logical following the evidence that pretrial
detention enhances probability of conviction. Id.
279. See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 887, 889 (Minn. 1991) (indicating that
substantiality of burden was threshold question).
280. Id. at 888. The only challenges to whether the bail setting policies' purposes were
legitimate probably would be due process or Eighth Amendment excessive bail challenges.
Those challenges presumably would be grounded on individual cases and not systemic failures.
The equal protection challenge, however, would be a challenge to the system, not just its
individual application. Id.
281. See id. (detailing requirements to satisfy Minnesota rational basis test).
282. Houston & Ewing, supra note 274, at Al (describing bail determination factors).
283. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889. Although the court did not clearly delineate the outer
boundaries of what constitutes "genuine," arguing that the nature of the crime is not genuine
would be very specious. Id.
284. See Boldt, supra note 236, at 2318 (listing family stability as one factor in ball
determination decision); Galloway, supra note 239, at 14 (citing Rand Corporation expert's
conclusion that one reason for increased incarceration of African-Americans is reliance on
employment in determination formulas); Houston & Ewing, supra note 274, at Al (listing bail
determination factors).
285. See Powell & Hershenov, supra note 13, at 559 n.5 (citing studies that indicate
poverty and unemployment often coincide with minority status); Galloway, supra note 239, at
14 (noting that Rand Corporation studies show that African-Americans score worse when
judges consider unemployment as factor in decisionmaking process); Houston & Ewing, supra




those factors, courts would eventually deny bail to those defendants, a decision
leading to pretrial detention.2 6 Moreover, even if bail is set at a relatively
low amount, because statistically more minority defendants belong to lower
socio-economic classes, those defendants are incapable of raising even the
meager amount necessary to post bail.w All of these factors contribute to
the pretrial incarceration of more minorities than Caucasians. 288
If the purpose of bail is to assure attendance at trial, a court could
determine that employment status and family and community ties are not
relevant to the inquiry and serve as arbitrary criteria for the bail determina-
tion.2 9 The court would, of course, be providing its own judgment on the
validity of relevant bail-determining factors. 29° Because no other constitutional
provisions would guide the court, the court would be free to reach whatever
conclusion it desired.291 Additionally, if the purpose of bail is to permit the
defendant to build the best defense possible, then a court might conclude
that the factors that disparately impact minorities are not relevant to that
goal either. 292
D. Sentencing
Several aspects of state sentencing policies and procedures also might be
invalid under the Russell analysis. 293 Whether the jurisdiction uses a deter-
minate sentencing scheme, such as prescriptive sentencing guidelines, 294 or an
286. See Houston & Ewing, supra note 274, at Al (indicating higher pretrial detention
rates for minorities and examining bail determination factors).
287. See id. (arguing that because African-American incomes are on average lower than
Caucasian incomes, even if judges set bonds at equal levels for African-Americans and
Caucasians, disparately more African-Americans would be unable to obtain the necessary
resources).
288. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (discussing disproportionately large
percentage of minorities incarcerated pretrial).
289. See McKnight, supra note 25, at 733-35 (criticizing Minnesota court's substantive
review standard).
290. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 902 (Minn. 1991) (Coyne, J., dissenting).
291. Id.; see McKnight, supra note 25, at 738 (arguing that problem with substantive
review is that courts can invoke it at any time under Minnesota Supreme Court's approach).
292. See McKnight, supra note 25, at 733-38 (arguing that frequent use of substantive
review could call any legislative or executive decision into question and create sense of
unpredictability in judicial review).
293. See Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 891 (invalidating statute sentencing guidelines provision).
294. See Nelson, supra note 265, at 220 (defining prescriptive sentencing guidelines);
Michael Tonry, The Politics and Processes of Sentencing Commissions, 37 CmaiE & DELINQ.
307, 311 (1991) (defining prescriptive guidelines as those that presume the appropriate sentence
in individual cases should fall within authorized range); Andrew H. Malcolm, Sentencing
Criminals: A Formula for Fairness, N.Y. Tims, Feb. 17, 1990, § 1 at 10 (describing how
California's prescriptive sentencing guidelines apply formulas in every sentencing decision).
The federal system, California, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Washington all use
prescriptive sentencing guidelines. Tonry, supra, at 311. For the purpose of this Note,
prescriptive and presumptive guidelines are synonymous.
19931 1825
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1791
indeterminate sentencing scheme, such as voluntary guidelines 29 5 or no guide-
lines, 29 studies have indicated that minorities receive longer sentences and
actually serve more time than Caucasians convicted of similar offenses. 29 As
with every other aspect of the criminal justice system, the sentencing schemes
are not discriminatory in purpose but only in effect. 298 Many jurisdictions
adopted determinate sentencing plans in an effort to eliminate racial disparities
in sentencing. 29
Despite the designed intent of reducing sentencing disparity, statistics
indicate that even the determinate sentencing schemes may not have eliminated
the racial disparity problem.3°° Moreover, even if the determinate scheme has
eliminated the bulk of the discriminatory effects of indeterminate sentencing
schemes, particular areas of sentencing guidelines schemes, especially involving
drug offenses, could result in racially disparate impacts.30 Such was the issue
295. See Developments, supra note 13, at 1627-29 (describing mechanics of indeterminate
sentencing scheme); Nelson, supra note 265, at 220 (comparing voluntary guidelines to pre-
scriptive guidelines). Nelson's comparison implies that voluntary guidelines are voluntary
because they do not have the force of law. Id.; see also Tonry, supra note 294, at 310 (defining
voluntary guidelines as judicially adopted and not legislatively enacted).
296. See Nelson, supra note 265, at 220 (listing varieties of sentencing schemes).
297. See Developments, supra note 13, at 1630 n.35 (citing studies finding that minorities
receive longer sentences than Caucasians); Heaney, supra note 14, at 205-07 (finding that
under Federal Sentencing Guidelines, African-American males still receive longer sentences
than Caucasians); Nelson, supra note 265, at 247-48 (indicating that race still factors into
sentencing decisions); Forer, supra note 14, at 16 (citing study indicating African-American
males serve longer prison terms than Caucasian males); Marcus, supra note 264, at A4 (citing
Federal Judicial Center study finding that African-Americans' sentences were longer than
Caucasians); Thompson, supra note 264, at A6 (maintaining that mandatory sentencing laws
account for longer sentences for minorities).
298. See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 900 (Minn. 1991) (Coyne, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging that legislature did not intend to discriminate against minorities when it
established crack-powder distinction); Morris, supra note 13, at 113 (maintaining that law and
order movement is discriminatory in effect but not intent); Thompson, supra note 264, at A6
(indicating that racial disparities continue to exist even though Congress enacted Sentencing
Guidelines to eliminate disparities).
299. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING CONNSSION: UNPUBLIsHED PuBLc HEARINGS 1986
(1988) (indicating that chief purpose of Federal Sentencing Guidelines was to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records guilty of similar criminal conduct);
Developments, supra note 13, at 1637 (stating that jurisdictions adopted determinate sentencing
in order to alleviate flaws of indeterminate schemes); Heaney, supra note 14, at 162 (listing
Congressional goals in adopting Sentencing Guidelines); Nelson, supra note 265, at 220
(recounting reasons for adopting determinate sentencing scheme); Duff Wilson, State Drug
Laws Tilt Against Blacks, SEATTLE TImas, Jan. 17, 1993, at Al (stating that legislature intended
sentencing laws to reduce discretion and decrease disparate racial treatment).
300. Heaney, supra note 14, at 205; see also Forer, supra note 13, at 16 (citing Federal
Sentencing Commission data that indicates African-American males now serve 83.4 months to
Caucasian males' 53.7 months for same offenses); Thompson, supra note 264, at A6 (noting
that one reason for continued disparity is that prosecutors charge minorities with crimes subject
to mandatory minimum sentences more often than they charge Caucasians with such crimes).
301. See Jim Newton, Harsher Crack Sentences Criticized as Racial Inequity, L.A. TIMs,
Nov. 23, 1992, at Al (noting disparate sentencing treatment between "ice" and crack). Newton
comments that although medical evidence indicates the effects of smoking ice are greater than
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the Russell court addressed with regard to the crack-powder distinction. 0 2
Similarly, nearly every state has adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances
Act, 30 which establishes analogous distinctions between illegal drugs. 04 Thus,
if a state court found that African-Americans use one substance which receives
a more severe sentence than a similar substance which Caucasians use, then
that court could invalidate that distinction. Hypothetically, if possession of
ten grams of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), a hallucinogenic drug, receives
the same penalty as possession of 100 grams of phencyclidine (PCP), another
hallucinogenic drug, and more African-Americans use LSD and Caucasians
use PCP, then the state court may invalidate the LSD-PCP distinction. °0 As
with the distinction between crack cocaine and powder cocaine, even if the
legislature determined that although the hallucinogenic effect on the brain
may be similar, LSD is more dangerous, and therefore possession of a lower
quantity of LSD should result in the same sentence as possession of a much
greater quantity of PCP, the court could strike down the sentencing distinc-
tion.306 Moreover, a court could use the Russell approach to invalidate such
a distinction based on gender discrimination or possibly age discrimination if
the court accepted the Minnesota Court of Appeals determination that the
Russell rational basis test should apply to all equal protection challenges. °7
Additionally, courts might use Russell analysis to invalidate capital sen-
tencing schemes. 3 Statistics indicate that race plays an integral role in capital
punishment throughout the country.309 For instance, more African-Americans
crack, possession of crack still carries twice as severe a penalty as possession of ice. Id. Newton
implies that the justification might be that most ice dealers and users are Caucasian while
most crack dealers are African-American. Id. The disparate treatment of these drugs could
also serve as the basis for equal protection challenges.
302. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
303. UNrs. CONTROUED SUBsTANCEs ACT, 9 U.L.A. (1988). Only New Hampshire and
Vermont have not enacted any sections of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.
304. Id. at §§ 101-401. The state of Washington, for example, adopted a sentencing
distinction between possession of ciack and powder cocaine very similar to Minnesota's
distinction. See Wilson, supra note 299, at Al (noting similarities in the sentencing laws of
the two states).
305. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iv)-(v) (1988). Section (b) penalizes any person who possesses
either 10 grams of LSD or 100 grams of PCP to a mandatory term of imprisonment of at
least 10 years.
306. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1988) (setting penalties for drug possession offenses based
on congressional determination of dangerousness of specific drugs).
307. See Mitchell v. Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896, 904 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (ruling that
Russell standard applies to any state equal protection challenge). If statistics indicate that
females use LSD more than they use PCP and males are more likely to use PCP, an innovative
defense attorney could raise the Russell argument based on gender discrimination. Presumably,
at least the Minnesota Court of Appeals would then engage in substantive review of the
sentencing scheme. Id.
308. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987). McCleskey grounded his equal
protection claim on statistical proof of disparate racial impact of capital punishment in
Georgia. Id.
309. See David C. Baldus et al., Monitoring and Evaluating Contemporary Death Sen-
tencing Systems Lessons from Georgia, 18 U.C. DAviS L. REa. 1375, 1399-1402 (1985) (finding
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receive capital sentences than Caucasians. 10 Additionally, murderers whose
victims are Caucasian are more likely to receive the death penalty than
murderers of minority victims."' The evidence from McCleskey v. Kemp
indicated that race significantly influenced the decision whether or not to
impose the death penalty.
31 2
Under Russell analysis, such evidence would serve to establish the sub-
stantial burden necessary to trigger the three-part review. 13 As with the other
facets of the criminal justice system that are facially neutral but discriminatory
in impact, once the court decides the statistics satisfy the threshold require-
ment, whether the court will invalidate the procedure depends primarily on
the court's application of the three-part test and its evaluation of the evidence
supporting the distinctions.31 4 The court independently would evaluate the
procedures used in capital cases.311 Similarly, the court independently would
examine the differences between those defendants who received death penalties
and those who did not. 31 6 The court then would decide for itself whether the
classifications are arbitrary or genuine.
317
IV. SOLUTION
As the previous examples illustrate, courts could decide to use Russell
substantive equal protection analysis to invalidate a variety of facially neutral
race of victim influences death penalty decisions); Samuel R. Gross, Race and Death: The
Judicial Evaluation of Evidence of Discrimination in Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
Prv. 1275, 1279-82 (1985) (discussing 10 different studies that concluded that substantial
discrimination exists in capital sentencing by race of victim); Kennedy, supra note 60, at 1396
n.25 (citing studies finding that race influences capital sentencing decisions); Morris, supra
note 13, at 112 (noting that African-Americans account for 42% of death row inmates); Joseph
F. Sullivan, Race Engulfs Study on Using Death Penalty, N.Y. TIam, Sept. 26, 1991, at B2
(citing Baldus study in New Jersey finding that minority offenders run greater risk of receiving
death penalty).
310. See Morris, supra note 13, at 112 (citing statistics in dicating race plays crucial role
in capital sentencing); Kathy Fair, Lethal Justice, HOUSTON CHRON., May 24, 1992, at Al
(noting that county in Texas sends more African-Americans to death row than Caucasians).
311. See Developments, supra note 13, at 1618-19 (citing study that supports Baldus'
finding that murderers of Caucasian victims are more likely to receive death penalty); Kennedy,
supra note 60, at 1396 n.27 (citing numerous studies concluding that race of victim plays
determinate role in capital sentencing); Dyckman, supra note 260, at 13A (referring to Florida
study finding courts sentence killers of Caucasian victims to death four times as often as they
sentence killers of minority victims).
312. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (discussing findings of Baldus study).
313. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 887, 889 (Minn. 1991).
314. See supra notes 212-21 and accompanying text (recounting Justice Coyne's discussion
of subjectivity of substantive review). Because substantive review primarily involves independent
judiciary evaluation, a court which opposes capital punishment could use statistical disparate
impact evidence as the means to invalidate the death penalty.
315. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 902 (Coyne, J., dissenting).
316. Id., 477 N.W.2d at 889-91.
317. Id., 477 N.W.2d at 902 (Coyne, J., dissenting).
1828
SUBSTANTIVE EQUAL PROTECTION
criminal procedures 38 that disparately impact minorities.3 9 Although some-
thing must be done to remedy the disproportionate impact problems, the
Minnesota Supreme Court's approach is not the best available means. One
problem associated with pure statistical impact analysis is that the statistics
are seldom conclusive. 32° Rather, most studies suffer from a variety of
underlying methodological flaws that undermine the credibility of the statistical
data.32' Therefore, judicial reliance on statistical evidence of disparate impact
in the criminal process is subject to the charge that the courts are relying on
defective evidence.
3" "
In addition to the problems associated with the judiciary's drawing
conclusions from statistical evidence, another problem with "heightened ra-
tional basis review" is that no tenable intermediate ground exists for review
of facially neutral legislative decisions. 3"3 Because no tenable intermediate
318. See supra note 263 and accompanying text (discussing disparate impact of mandatory
sentencing laws). In the case of mandatory sentencing, the mandatory sentencing laws do not
target any particular racial group and yet under the Russell court's analysis those statutes
could be invalid. In Russell, because the crack-powder distinction resulted in a statistical
disparate impact, the law was unconstitutional. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 891. Similarly, because
the mandatory sentencing laws tend to result in lengthier sentences for minorities, those laws
also may be invalid.
319. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (indicating increased willingness on part
of state courts to adopt review standards independent of federal doctrines).
320. See supra notes 13-16, 19 and accompanying text (discussing studies which reach,
different conclusions as to whether racial discrimination exists in criminal justice system and
evaluating methodologies of those studies); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313
(1987) (determining that Baldus study was insufficient to establish significant risk of racial
bias in capital sentencing scheme).
321. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text (discussing underlying methodological
flaws in most criminal justice system studies); see also Klein et. al., supra note 16, at 812
(noting that most criminal justice studies fail to account for important range of variables, and
specifically assailing two recent studies).
322. See Savage, supra note 15, at 19 (indicating that Supreme Court is squeamish about
relying on study-generated statistical evidence). If, on the other hand, the legislature relies on
faulty evidence and the public determines such reliance was unwise, the public can always vote
the legislators out of office. See ROBERT H. BORK, Tim TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE PoLrIIcAL
SEDucTIoN OF THE LAW 45-46 (1990) (arguing that substantive review is judicial usurpation of
legislative powers and that legislature is proper forum for these types of decisions because
legislature is accountable to the people).
323. See Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of
Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 36, 50-51 (1977) (asserting that pure disparate
impact test is not acceptable alternative to intent requirement and noting that variety of other
proposals exist); Randall Fox, Equal Protection Analysis: Laurence Tribe, The Middle Tier,
and the Role of the Court, 14 U.S.F. L. REv. 525, 561-66 (1980) (indicating application
problems with heightened rational basis review); Dennis J. Hutchinson, More Substantive
Equal Protection? A Note on Plyler v. Doe, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 167, 180 (explaining that
Supreme Court's use of conceivable basis test is partially result of Court's determination that
any higher standard of review would result in invalidation of judgments upon which reasonable
people may differ); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. RFv. 197, 208
(1976) (arguing that any rational basis review with bite inevitably leads courts to evaluate
classification on basis of some policy objective other than immediate effect of law); Suzanna
Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context: Democracy, Distrust, and
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approach exists, courts are left with all-or-nothing approaches. Either a court
follows the federal equal protection conceivable basis test that almost always
yields to legislative judgments, 24 or the court actually reviews the rationality
and substantiality of the classification.23 Even the commentators who argue
that the United States Supreme Court's purposeful discrimination requirement
is too deferential to legislative judgments do not agree on the level of
substantive review a court should invoke when reviewing facially neutral
classifications that result in disproportionate impacts.
26
Racially disparate impacts in the criminal justice system are a problem
and some remedy is necessary when a classification obviously imposes a
disproportionate burden on minorities. 27 The judiciary, though, is not the
proper forum for evaluating statistical evidence of disparate impact in the
criminal justice context.3 2 Rather, the legislature should determine the accu-
racy of the statistical evidence and the viability of the facially neutral policies
that arguably discriminate against minorities.3 29 The legislature is better equipped
Deconstruction, 73 GEo. L.J. 89, 125 (1984) (arguing that challenge to process theorists is to
create middle ground, but implying none exists).
324. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (noting that Supreme Court almost
always upholds legislative classifications under rational basis review); see also Note, Equal
Protection: A Closer Look at Closer Scrutiny, 76 MIcH. L. REV. 771, 790 (1978) (asserting
that under conceivable basis test, almost all equal protection challenges fail). "
325. See Hutchinson, supra note 323, at 180 (noting that higher standard of review
involves judicial intrusion onto legislative authority).
326. See supra note 323 and accompanying text (noting disagreement over proper approach
to heightened rational basis review).
327. See Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal,
79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1042 (1.979) (noting that general agreement among scholars exists
that some remedy to disparate impact policies is imperative).
328. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text (indicating difficulties with judicial
evaluation of criminal justice statistical evidence). Although the judiciary relies on statistical
evidence in employment, voting, and jury venire cases, those cases are distinguishable from
the type of statistics in the criminal justice context. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
293-94 (1987) (distinguishing capital sentencing study from employment and jury selection
cases). The statistics in employment, voting, and jury selection cases are basically simple
comparisons between the available pool of eligible participants and the actual participation
rates. Id. The studies that attempt to indicate racial bias in the criminal justice system, on the
other hand, must try to account for numerous variables in determining whether discrimination
exists. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text (discussing methodological flaws with
studies). Because no study is flawless, reliance on such a study as absolute proof of discrim-
ination or proof discrimination does not exist is tenuous at best.
329. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (deciding that legislatures are
better able than courts to evaluate statistical evidence); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat) 316 (1819) (establishing that as long as government's purpose is legitimate and means
are rational, then judiciary should defer to judgment of legislature on issues about which
reasonable minds might differ); see also ALEXANDER M. BIcKEL, THE LEAsT DANGERous
BRANCH: THE SuPRME?. COuRT AT THE BAR oF PoLrrcs 21-22 (2d ed. 1982) (arguing that
judicial review in general is counter-majoritarian and if not restrained could weaken democratic
processes and weaken legislative authority); Hutchinson, supra note 323, at 180 (noting that
any higher standard of rational basis review will lead to invalidation of legislative judgments
upon which reasonable people may differ); Sherry, supra note 323, at 95 (noting that allowing
judges to substitute their judgments for the legislature's is counter-majoritarian and inconsistent
with need for principles of predictability in judicial process).
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to evaluate the statistical evidence. 30 Moreover, the legislature is better able
to determine whether the facially neutral classification is the best means of
achieving the legitimate purpose of crime control.3 3 ' Additionally, even the
judiciary agrees that its role is not to second-guess the wisdom of legislative
policies.3 32 In McCleskey, for example, the United States Supreme Court
stated bluntly that McCleskey should present his arguments to the legislature
rather than the judiciary.
333
V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Russell tried to rectify what
it thought to be an egregious wrong. 33 In solving the problem and invalidating
the distinction between crack and powder cocaine, the court substituted its
judgment for that of the legislature.3 35 Such an approach has not been
acceptable judicial review since the United States Supreme Court rejected that
Lochner-type analysis in 1937.336
The Minnesota court, though, would renew that substantive review under
the auspices of rational basis review of equal protection challenges. 337 The
judiciary should not encroach upon legislative powers. The legislature is better
able to evaluate the significance and accuracy of disparate impact evidence,
especially in the criminal justice context.338 Therefore, the legislatures and not
the judiciary should become the leaders in preserving equal protection guar-
antees from policies that disproportionately burden minorities.
JEF RY A. KRusE
330. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (citing sources indicating difficulties
associated with judicial evaluation of statistical evidence generated by criminal justice studies).
The function of the legislature is to evaluate conflicting evidence on controversial issues and
reach compromise policies which are satisfactory to the public. If the public disagrees, then
the legislators will learn of the public displeasure during the next election.
331. See BosRi, supra note 322, at 49 (arguing that democracy is foundation of American
system and therefore popularly elected legislature should make important political decisions not
the judiciary); Davis, supra note 42, at 294 (noting Chief Justice Rehnquist's view that judiciary's
proper function is not to intrude upon political decisions of legislative branch). The legislature's
job is to determine the correct course of action regarding politically divisive issues.
332. See supra note 89 (citing cases in which United States Supreme Court acknowledges
its role is not to rule on the wisdom of legislative policies).
333. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987).
334. State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 888 n.2 (Minn. 1991).
335. Id. at 902 (Coyne, J., dissenting).
336. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (indicating that United States
Supreme Court rejects substantive due process review and citing Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934), and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)); see also
McKnight, supra note 24, at 733 (discussing disfavored status of substantive review by United
States Supreme Court and commentators).
337. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889-91.
338. See supra notes 93-97, 320-22, 328 (citing authorities indicating that judiciary is not
suited for evaluation of statistical evidence and that such decisions fall within ambit of
legislative authority).
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